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They blend along small-town streets 
Like a race of giants that have faded into mere mythology.1 
- John Updike, “Telephone Poles” 
I.  SAFETY, COMPETITION, RELIABILITY, RATE, AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS 
POSED BY UTILITY POLE ASSOCIATION RULES AND ROLES 
The humble wooden utility pole, first deployed in America in 1844 to extend 
telegraph service,2 forms the twenty-first century’s technological scaffold.  
Many states adopted laws in the mid-nineteenth through the early twentieth 
centuries granting rights-of-way (ROW) to construct utility poles, wires, and 
facilities to transmit electric and communications signals.3  First telegraph, then 
telephone, electricity, cable, wireless, and Internet Service Providers (ISPs) 
                                                 
 1. JOHN UPDIKE, TELEPHONE POLES AND OTHER POEMS (1963). 
 2. See April Mulqueen & Marzia Zafar, A Brief Introduction to Utility Poles, CAL. PUB. 
UTIL. COMM’N 5 (2014), http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUC_Public_Website/Content/ 
About_Us/Organization/Divisions/Policy_and_Planning/PPD_Work/PPDUtilityPole.pdf 
[hereinafter Mulqueen, Brief Introduction to Utility Poles]. 
 3. See, e.g., An Act Concerning Corporations, ch. 128, § 150, 1850 Cal. Stat. 369; T-Mobile 
West LLC v. City & Cty. of S.F., 438 P.3d 239, 244 n.9 (2019) (“The predecessor of Public Utilities 
Code section 7901, Civil Code section 536, was first enacted in 1872 as part of the original Civil 
Code.”). 
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sought to attach facilities to wooden, and later steel or composite, utility poles.4  
As the twentieth century dawned, several California electric and telephone 
companies formed Joint Pole Committees (JPCs) that stand sentry over utility 
pole access through private governance and standard-setting.5  This article 
argues that JPC standard-setting outside of regulatory supervision creates a 
safety gap in utility pole maintenance and operation and constrains competitive 
access to critical utility facilities and ROW.  This Article offers a framework to 
put safety, competition, and accountable governance at the forefront of utility 
pole, conduit, and ROW regulation. 
This article lifts the veil JPCs have maintained for more than a century over 
their function and rules.  JPCs have effectively guarded their rules as member 
secrets by not registering as non-profits and operating largely without 
government supervision.  JPC members include investor-owned utilities (IOUs), 
municipal utilities, irrigation districts, and some municipalities that have formed 
associations to “share expenses regarding ownership, maintenance, use, setting, 
replacement, dismantling, relinquishment or removal of jointly owned 
poles.”6   The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) and competition 
authorities owe no deference to JPC standards, rules, functions, or decisions.7  
Scrutiny of JPC rules, roles, and risks is long overdue. 
The CPUC’s 2016 Competition Order Instituting Investigation (OII)—which 
my colleagues and I unanimously voted to adopt when I served as a CPUC 
Commissioner—observed that “utility poles, whether owned by electric utilities 
or legacy phone companies or jointly, and corresponding rights of way are areas 
where safety and competition goals, and asserted property rights, meet and 
potentially clash.”8  The CPUC concluded that “[i]f a pole association had 
                                                 
 4. April Mulqueen, A Natural History of the Wooden Utility Pole, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N 
8-11 (July 2017), https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUC_Public_Website/Content/ 
About_Us/Organization/Divisions/Policy_and_Planning/PPD_Work_Products_(2014_forward)(1
)/UtilityPoleBook060617.pdf. 
 5. See, e.g., Southern California Joint Pole Committee, SCJPC.NET, scjpc.net, May 11, 
2020. 
 6. See, e.g., About the NCJPA, N. CAL. JOINT POLE ASS’N, http://www.ncjpa.org/about/ (last 
visited June 11, 2020). 
 7. Final Arbitrator’s Report In Re Application of Crown Castle NG West LLC (U6745C), 
Pursuant to Decision 98-10-058 for Arbitration of Dispute over Denial by Pacific Gas and Electric 
Company (U39E) of Access to Utility Support Structures, Application 18-10-004, CAL. PUB. UTIL. 
COMM’N 2 (Jan. 31, 2019), https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M318/ 
K554/318554372.pdf [hereinafter CPUC Final Arbitrator’s Report, Crown Castle PG&E 
Arbitration].  See also Decision Affirming Final Arbitrator’s Report and Order That Parties Adopt 
Revised License Agreement, Decision 19-10-037, Application 18-10-004, CAL. PUB. UTIL. 
COMM’N 2-3 (October 24, 2019). 
 8. Decision Analyzing the California Telecommunications Market And Directing Staff To 
Continue Data Gathering Monitoring And Reporting On The Market in the Order Instituting 
Investigation into the State of Competition Among Telecommunications Providers in California, 
and to Consider and Resolve Questions raised in the Limited Rehearing of Decision 08-09-042, 
Decision 16-12-025, Investigation 15-11-007, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N 110 (Dec. 1, 2016), 
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internal policies, membership rules, or other standards that effectively operated 
to exclude new members or make their pole access onerous, that would raise 
concerns about barriers to market entry.”9 
In 2017, the CPUC initiated a Utility Pole Census and Competitive Access 
OII and Order Instituting Rulemaking (OIR) (I.17-06-027, and R.17-06-028) to 
analyze JPC functions, utility pole safety, competition, and maintenance issues, 
and to consider ordering a utility pole census.10  The CPUC explained that 
“[c]ompetitive carriers like Sonic and Google Fiber/Webpass have complained 
about difficulties they have experienced in trying to attach to poles and access 
underground conduit.”11  The CPUC’s proceedings seek to determine whether 
the JPCs, the Northern California Joint Pole Association (NCJPA) or the 
Southern California Joint Pole Committee (SCJPC), “have policies, membership 
rules, or other standards in effect that operate to exclude new members or make 
access to poles onerous or even impossible.”12 
Neither JPCs nor their members enjoy immunities from federal antitrust or 
state unfair competition laws.  Nor are JPCs exempt from tort laws for operation 
and maintenance policies and practices that contribute to hazards or unduly 
interfere with prospective business advantage.  JPCs are not privileged to 
undermine CPUC rules and policies designed to promote safety and competitive 
utility pole access, twin policies that are often intertwined. 
My research found no academic articles examining the role, rules, and risks 
of utility pole associations in pole access and management.  This Article fills 
that academic and regulatory analysis gap by examining JPCs’ history and 
function as California faces climate change, higher safety and fire risks, and an 
altered competitive landscape. 
Analyzing utility governance and infrastructure safety risks is a top priority as 
climate change and drought fuel California’s fire risk.13  In California, “[f]ifteen 
                                                 
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M171/K031/171031953.pdf [hereinafter 
CPUC Competition OII Decision 16-12-025]. 
 9. Id. at 181 (citing Allied Tube v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 509 (1988) (“hope of 
procompetitive benefits depends upon the existence of safeguards sufficient to prevent the 
standard‐ setting process from being biased by members with economic interests in restraining 
competition.”)). 
 10. Order Instituting Investigation Into The Creation Of A Shared Database Or Statewide 
Census Of Utility Poles And Conduit In The Order Instituting Rulemaking Into Access By 
Competitive Communications Providers To California Utility Poles And Conduit, Consistent With 
The Commission’s Safety Regulations, Investigation, 17-06-027, Rulemaking 17-06-028, CAL. 
PUB. UTIL. COMM’N 4 (July 10, 2017), http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/ 
M191/K656/191656519.PDF [hereinafter CPUC Pole Census OII]. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 43. 
 13. See Decision Approving Pilots for Matinee Pricing, Decision 16-11-021, CAL. PUB. UTIL. 
COMM’N 2 (Nov. 10, 2016) http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M169/ 
K487/169487466.PDF (“California is undergoing an unprecedented drought, replete with grim 
implications for California’s economy in general, and for energy supply, food supply and farm-
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of the 20 most destructive wildfires in the state’s history have occurred since 
2000; ten of the most destructive fires have occurred since 2015.”14  California 
Governor Newsom’s Energy and Wildfire Strike Force reported in 2019 that 
“[i]n the past four years, equipment owned by California’s three largest investor-
owned utilities sparked more than 2,000 fires.”15  Longer fire seasons make 
utility-caused fires even more likely. 
In 2014, the Union of Concerned Scientists identified several consequences 
of climate change for the energy sector including the following: accelerating sea 
level rise; increasing wildfires; more frequent and intense heat waves; droughts 
and reduced water supplies; and elevated water temperatures.16  As Governor 
Newsom’s Strike Force advised, “[h]ardening the electrical grid is thus a critical 
component to overall wildfire risk management.”17  Further, “[m]easures 
commonly used to harden the electrical grid include using insulated electrical 
lines in high-risk areas, replacing wood poles with steel, installing specialized 
monitoring equipment, and using new technologies that can reduce sparks or 
undergrounding lines when necessary in extreme high-fire areas.”18  Utility pole, 
infrastructure, and ROW governance is critical to grid hardening, safety, 
reliability, competition, and the achievement of climate change mitigation 
strategies.19 
A.  Article Organization 
Part II of this Article traces the historical development of utility rights-of-way 
rules in California.  It examines JPC formation at the turn-of-the twentieth 
century, followed by California state policies to promote competition and safety.  
Part III examines interrelated principles that animate state and federal regulation 
                                                 
related employment in particular.  On January 17, 2014, Governor Brown declared a Drought State 
of Emergency . . . On April 25, 2014, the Governor declared a continued state of emergency.”). 
 14. Governor Newsom’s Strike Force, Wildfires and Climate Change: California’s Energy 
Future 1 (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Wildfires-and-
Climate-Change-California’s-Energy-Future.pdf (emphasis removed) (“Warmer temperatures, 
variable snowpack, and earlier snowmelt caused by climate change make for longer and more 
intense dry seasons, leaving forests more susceptible to severe fire.”). 
 15. Id. at 2 (citing Carolyn Kousky et al., Wildfire Costs In California: The Role of Electric 
Utilities, WHARTON RISK MGMT. AND DECISION PROCESSES CTR. (Sept. 2018), 
https://riskcenter.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Wildfire-Cost-in-CA-Role-of-
Utilities-1.pdf). 
 16. Power Failure: How Climate Change Puts Our Electricity at Risk, UNION OF 
CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Apr. 22, 2014), https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/power-failure. 
 17. Governor Newsom’s Strike Force, supra note 14, at 2. 
 18. Id. at. n.9. 
 19. See Catherine Sandoval, Principles for Utility Regulation in the Face of Increasing 
Wildfire Risk, Markkula Center for Applied Ethics at Santa Clara University (Dec. 4, 2018), 
https://www.scu.edu/ethics/all-about-ethics/principles-for-utility-regulation-in-the-face-of-
increasing-wildfire-risk/ [hereinafter Catherine Sandoval, Principles for Utility Regulation in the 
Face of Increasing Wildfire Risk]. 
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of utility pole access: competition and reliability, along with state focus on 
safety. 
Part IV analyzes the NCJPA’s restrictive membership rules that confer 
incumbents with effective veto power over potential competitors whom the 
CPUC authorizes to attach to utility poles.20  It also examines NCJPA’s 2017 
representations to the CPUC about its status as a “non-profit formedto [sic] be 
formed.”21  NCJPA’s 1998 Agreement states that it will be formed as a non-
profit,22 a fact that indicates NCJPA’s 2017 representation of its status to the 
CPUC is more than a typo.  If JPCs were registered non-profits, their bylaws, 
articles of incorporation, and more information about their work would be 
publicly available.  JPC characterization of their organization as a non-profit is 
material to attracting members to join and put their poles under JPC control. 
Research for this Article reveals the absence of public records of NCJPA 
federal or state tax filings or filing for non-profit status in the State of 
California23 despite its operation in the state for more than one hundred years.24  
The SCJPC has filed federal taxes as a non-profit association 501(c)(12), but 
public records neither show that SJPC has filed for non-profit status in 
California, nor has it filed California taxes as of December 26, 2020.25  
                                                 
 20. See 1998 Northern California Joint Pole Agreement, (January 1, 1998), 
https://bsm.sfdpw.org/pics/14WR-0139/NCJPA%20Agreement.pdf; 
https://www.perma.cc/YP3A-78G6 [hereinafter NCJPA Agreement]. 
 21. Tina Simms, Panel 1 Presentation at the California Public Utilities Commission Pole and 
Conduits Database and Applications Workshop 6 (Mar. 17, 2017), http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/ 
WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=6442453009 (describing NCJPA organization status and 
function). 
 22. NCJPA Agreement, supra note 20, § 2(b), at 2. 
 23. Search Query for Northern California Joint Pole Association, PROPUBLICA NONPROFIT 
EXPLORER, https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/search?utf8=%E2%9C%93&q=Northern+ 
California+Joint+Pole+Association&state%5Bid%5D=&ntee%5Bid%5D=&c_code%5Bid%5D= 
(last visited Feb. 6, 2021) (finding no results for the Northern California Joint Pole Committee) 
[hereinafter ProPublica NCJPA search finding no such non-profit]; NCJPA, OPEN 990, 
https://www.open990.org/search/org?name_org=See+all+matches+for+%22NCJPA%22 (search 
yielding no results) (last visited Feb. 6, 2021); Northern California Joint Pole Association, OPEN 
990,  
https://www.open990.org/search/org?name_org=See+all+matches+for+%22Northern+California
+Joint+Pole+Association%22; see State of California Dept. of Justice, Registry Reports, 
https://www.oag.ca.gov/charities/reports#crr (no registration found for Northern California Joint 
Pole Association or NCJPA) (last visited Feb. 6, 2021); cf. State of California Dept. of Justice, 
Registry Reports, https://webapp.ftb.ca.gov/eLetter/ (reporting no results for search for California 
Franchise Tax Board filing by Northern California Joint Pole Association or NCJPA) (last visited 
Feb. 6, 2021). 
 24. See sources discussed in supra note 23; see sources discussed in infra note 25. 
 25. See IRS, Tax Exempt Organization Search, Southern California Joint Pole Committee, 
https://apps.irs.gov/app/eos/detailsPage?ein=950884090&name=SOUTHERN%20CALIFORNIA
%20JOINT%20POLE%20COMMITTEE&city=&state=&countryAbbr=US&type=returnsSearch 
(reporting federal IRS non-profit registration as a 501(c)(12) for Southern California Joint Pole 
Committee) (last visited Dec. 26, 2020).  Cf. State of California Dept. of Justice, Registry Reports, 
https://www.oag.ca.gov/charities/reports#crr (no registration found for Southern California Joint 
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California law requires charities including non-profits operating in the State of 
California to register with the State26  This Article urges the CPUC and the 
California Attorney General’s Office to examine whether NCJPA statements 
about its non-profit status constitute an unfair business practice or violate CPUC 
rules requiring candor in dealing with the Commission.  It recommends that the 
California Attorney General’s Office examine the NCJPA and SCJPC’s non-
profit and tax status, determine whether these JPCs have made the requisite state 
non-profit registration and tax filings or are exempt, and refer federal tax filing 
issues as appropriate. 
Part V examines the role and function of utility pole associations and their 
competitive significance.  Part VI examines competitive barriers erected by JPC 
rules and roles focusing on Google’s attempts to deploy fiber services in 
California.  It analyzes whether utility pole asset transfer transactions facilitated 
by the JPC circumvent California Public Utilities Code (CA PU Code) § 851, 
which requires the CPUC to approve the sale or transfer of utility assets. 
Part VII examines the network effects of utility pole management.  This 
section argues that California’s policies to promote access to utility poles for 
competitors eliminate a potential antitrust defense under Colgate and Trinko that 
would otherwise defer to a competitor’s option to choose with whom to deal.  It 
contends that JPC restrictive membership agreements merit scrutiny under the 
Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. § 1 and California’s Cartwright 
Act.  Part VIII argues that the state action antitrust exemption does not apply to 
JPCs.  The State of California’s utility pole access policies are designed to 
promote, not displace, competition and neither the CPUC, nor any state entity, 
actively supervise the JPCs.  Part IX concludes with recommendations that the 
CPUC, as well as state and federal competition authorities, examine JPC rules 
and roles to protect competition. 
PG&E’s January 2019 bankruptcy filing following a series of devastating 
wildfires linked to utility infrastructure27 underscores the imperative of utility 
pole and infrastructure safety, maintenance, and competitive access.  Effective 
energy and communications markets depend on sound infrastructure to deliver 
                                                 
Pole Committee or SCJPC) (last visited Dec. 26, 2020).  Cf. Franchise Tax Board, Self-Serve Entity 
Status Letter, https://webapp.ftb.ca.gov/eletter/ (reporting no results for search for California 
Franchise Tax Board filing by Southern California Joint Pole Committee or SCJPC) (last visited 
Dec. 26, 2020). 
 26. Initial Registration, Charities, STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPT. OF JUSTICE 
https://oag.ca.gov/charities/initial-reg (“Every charitable corporation, unincorporated association, 
charitable trustee and other legal entities holding property for charitable purposes, must file with 
the Attorney General an initial registration form and other documents required by law,” as required 
by CA Gov. Code §12585) (last visited Feb. 6, 2021). 
 27. PG&E CORPORATION AND PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, Case No. 19-30088, 
Prime Clerk, https://restructuring.primeclerk.com/pge/ (last visited June 11, 2020).  DECISION 
APPROVING REORGANIZATION PLAN, Decision 20-05-053, Investigation 19-09-016, CAL. 
PUB. UTIL. COMM’N (May 28, 2020). 
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power and communications services.  To promote competition, consumer 
choice, affordability, reliability, and safety, this Article sheds light on JPC rules, 
roles, and risks. 
II.  AS THE CENTURIES TURN; HISTORICAL AND LEGAL ANACHRONISMS OF JPC 
FORMATION 
What other tree can you climb where the birds’ twitter, 
Unscrambled, is English?28 
- John Updike, “Telephone Poles” 
A.  California Utility Rights of Way Authorization; From the State’s 1850 
Admission to the Union through the Dawn of the Twentieth Century 
Development of California’s utility pole network, first used for telegraph, then 
for telephone, electric, cable, wireless, and Internet services, traces to 
California’s Statutes of 1850 adopted shortly after California’s admission to the 
Union.  “Since 1850, the State of California has authorized the construction and 
maintenance of telegraph lines in the roads, highways and other public places in 
this state”29 by statute. 
In 1850, the California legislature adopted a statewide franchise allowing 
telegraph companies to use roads and highways in the state to erect infrastructure 
necessary to facilitate telegraph deployment.30  California’s 1850 statute 
authorized telegraph companies operating under Congress’ 1866 statute, which 
granted a nationwide franchise for the development of telegraph services, to use 
California roads and highways.31 
With its admission to statehood, California sought to encourage expansion of 
the telegraph consistent with its new state authority.  For telegraph associations, 
the Statutes of 1850 provided 
Such association is authorized to construct lines of telegraph along 
and upon any of the public roads and highways, or across any of the 
waters within the limits of this State, by the erection of the necessary 
fixtures, including posts, piers, or abutments, for sustaining the cords 
                                                 
 28. JOHN UPDIKE, TELEPHONE POLES AND OTHER POEMS, supra note 1. 
 29. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. San Francisco, 17 Cal. Rptr. 687, 691 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961). 
 30. An Act to Amend and Supplemental to an Act to Authorize the Formation of Corporations 
for the Construction of Plank And Turnpike Roads, ch. 148, § 150, 1857 Cal. Stat. 171; Fredric W. 
Kessler, An Old Law Meets a New Technology: Traditional Right-of-Way Access Rights Apply to 
Wireless Telephone Technology, NOSSAMAN LLP (Dec. 10, 2004), http://www.nossaman.com/an-
old-law-meets-new-technology-traditional. 
 31. See W. Union Tel. Co. v. Hopkins, 116 P. 557, 558–60 (Cal. 1911) (citing Act of Congress 
approved July 24, 1866, (chapter 230, 14 Stat. 221) (“An act to aid in the construction of telegraph 
lines, and to secure to the government the use of the same for postal and military and other 
purposes.”)). 
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or wires of such lines: Provided, the same shall not be so constructed 
as to incommode the public use of said roads and highways, or 
injuriously interrupt the navigation of said waters; nor shall this 
Chapter be so construed as to authorize the construction of any bridge 
across any of the waters of this State.32 
The statute authorized telegraph construction including erection of poles to 
support wires in a manner so as not to “incommode the public” use of roads and 
highways and was codified with minor amendment in 1872 as § 536 of the Civil 
Code.33  The California Supreme Court determined in 1911 that California Civil 
Code § 536 
. . . constituted a grant to telegraph companies of rights in regard to the 
streets of cities, in addition to the rights given by the act of Congress, 
which to the extent that they were accepted and availed of by any 
company, constituted a franchise granted by the state and accepted by 
the company.34 
This franchise included the use of bridges as part of the state highway system.35  
The California Supreme Court characterized the franchise as “an inducement to 
the companies [to whom] the State offered the use of roads and highways, 
without which there would probably have been no company able or willing to 
enter the State.  The franchise cost the State nothing.  The rewards were great.”36  
Telegraph facility construction commenced shortly thereafter and in “1853 a 
telegraph line was built from San Francisco to the entrance to the Golden Gate, 
and this was the first telegraph in California.”37 
California ratified its state constitution in 1879, thereby establishing and 
conferring on the California Railroad Commission authority to regulate 
utilities.38  That constitutional provision divested municipalities of regulatory 
power over utilities but left in place local “control over public utilities as 
relate[d] to the making and enforcement of local, police, sanitary and other 
regulations, other than the fixing of rates . . . .”39 
In 1911, the California legislature adopted an act to “regulate[] the erection 
and maintenance of poles, wires, etc., employed in overhead electric line 
construction.”40  In 1915, the California legislature required the California 
                                                 
 32. County of Los Angeles v. Gen. Tel. Co. of Cal., 57 Cal. Rptr. 805, 806 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1967). 
 33. Id. 
 34. W. Union Tel. Co., 116 P. at 562. 
 35. See Cty. of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 808. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. CAL. CONST. art. XII, § 23 (1879) (repealed 1974). 
 39. Id.; People ex rel. Freitas v. City & Cty. of S.F., 155 Cal. Rptr. 319, 323-24 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1979). 
 40. Rules for Overhead Electric Line Construction General Order No. 95, CAL. PUB. UTIL. 
COMM’N x (Jan. 2015), http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M146/ 
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Railroad Commission to “inspect all work affected by the provisions of the act, 
and to make such further additions and changes as it might deem necessary for 
the protection of employees and the general public.”41 
While telegraph service was being extended across the United States, patents 
were granted to Alexander Graham Bell in 1876 and 1877 for “improvements in 
telegraphy,” the telegraph, and “improvements in electric telephony,” now 
known as the telephone.42  The same year Bell’s first telephone patents were 
granted, the Supreme Court, in Munn v. Illinois, recognized the authority of 
states to regulate common carriers and public utilities.43  State regulation enabled 
the growth of telephone service and telephone companies by facilitating access 
to rights-of-way and telegraph poles to string wires carrying telephone signals. 
California Civil Code § 536 was adopted in 1905 to encourage expansion of 
telegraph and telephone facilities and services.44  In 1906, a year after the State 
of California extended rights-of-way franchises to telephone as well as telegraph 
companies, AT&T, Southern California Edison (SCE), and others formed the 
SCJPC, California’s first known JPC.45 
Three years later in 1909, AT&T bought a controlling share of Western Union, 
the nation’s largest telegraph company.46  Through its purchase of 30,000 
Western Union stock shares, AT&T “effectively gain[ed] 
working control of Western Union.”47   Professor Susan Crawford recounts 
AT&T’s and Western Union’s April 1910 “joint traffic agreement” that allowed 
users to send from any telephone a message “to any part of the world by the joint 
use of telephone, telegraph, and cable wires.”48  The joint traffic agreement 
                                                 
K646/146646565.pdf [hereinafter CPUC General Order 95] (citing the Act passed by the 
California Legislature on April 22, 1911, Ch. 499, Stat. of 1911, regulating overhead utility lines). 
 41. Id. (citing The Statues [sic] of 1915, Ch. 600, amending Ch. 499). 
 42. Dolbear v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 126 U.S. 1, 456, 456 (1888).  See also Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., 
525 U.S. 55, 55 (1998) (noting that The Telephone Cases upheld several patents issued 
to Alexander Graham Bell ”even though he had filed his application before constructing a 
working telephone.”). 
 43. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 129–30 (1876). 
 44. CAL. CIV. CODE § 536 (1986) (repealed 1997).  See also Petaluma v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. 
Co., 282 P.2d 43, 46 (1955) (“[S]ection 536, tendered to all [telephone and telegraph] corporations 
a franchise to use the highways for their lines, an acceptance of which is signified by their act in 
constructing the same over the highways so offered.”). 
 45. See Southern California Joint Pole Committee, OPEN 990, https://www.open990.com/ 
org/950884090/southern-california-joint-pole-committee/ (last visited June 11, 2020) (stating that 
it SCJPC is Tax-Exempt, BMF [Business Master File] updated April 17, 2020). 
 46. Susan P. Crawford, Transporting Communications, 89 B.U. L. REV. 871, 924 (2009) 
(citing JOHN BROOKS, TELEPHONE: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 134 (1976)).  See Southern 
California Joint Pole Committee, OPEN 990, https://www.open990.com/org/950884090/southern-
california-joint-pole-committee/ (last visited June 11, 2020) (stating that SCJPC is Tax-Exempt 
under 501(c)(12) from federal taxation, BMF [Business Master File] updated April 17, 2020). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id.  (quoting Wire Companies’ Merger: Western Union and Telephone Officer Discuss 
Joint Traffic Agreement, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1910, at 6). 
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sought to enable “an answer received promptly at the sending point without the 
necessity of the sender moving from his office or his home.”49 
Several independent telephone companies developed in the late 1800s through 
the early 1900s complained to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) about 
AT&T’s allegedly anti-competitive conduct following the adoption of Sherman 
Anti-Trust Act in 1890.50  In 1913, the DOJ brought an antitrust case against 
AT&T under § 2 of the Sherman Act alleging that AT&T abused its market 
power.51  The DOJ complaint alleged that the Bell system telephone companies 
AT&T controlled had “harassed” independent telephone companies “by 
refusing to interconnect Bell lines through with those of the independents, by 
lowering competitive rates, by furnishing poor service when ordered to 
interconnect their lines, and by otherwise acting in an illegal manner.”52  
AT&T’s December 1913 “Kingsbury Commitment” led to the settlement of the 
DOJ’s antitrust suit.53  AT&T agreed to dispose of its Western Union stock, to 
“refrain from acquiring competing telephone companies, and [to] offer toll-line 
connections to qualified independent telephone companies.”54 
That same year in 1913, AT&T and incumbent electric providers, including 
the predecessors of PG&E, formed the NCJPA.55  The Kingsbury Commitment 
did not address control of utility pole facilities, conduits, and rights-of-way 
critical to telegraph, telephone, as well as electric deployment and competition.  
NCJPA helped AT&T and the forerunners of PG&E extend telephone and 
electric service and consolidate market power in the utility pole and ROW 
                                                 
 49. Id. (quoting Wire Companies’ Merger: Western Union and Telephone Officer Discuss 
Joint Traffic Agreement, N.Y. TIMES Apr. 1, 1910, at 6).  See also id. at n.251 (reporting that AT&T 
and Western Union emphasized that they were not merging.  As the article explained, “[t]he 
telegraph and the telephone companies will continue separate and distinct organizations.  There has 
been no absorption, no merging, no consolidation.  Each has its own field, but there are certain 
points where they may meet on common ground and by mutual traffic arrangements increase their 
opportunities for public service.”). 
 50.  See Geoffrey M. Peters, Is the Third Time the Charm? A Comparison of the 
Government’s Major Antitrust Settlements with AT&T This Century, 15 SETON HALL L. REV. 252, 
253 (1985).  See also Act July 2, 1890, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C.A. § 1–7 (2012)). 
 51. Peters, supra note 50, at 254 (citing Original Petition, United States v. AT&T (D. Or. 
1913) (suit terminated by consent decree Mar. 26, 1914)). 
 52. Id.  (citing Original Petition, United States v. AT&T (D. Or. 1913) at 16-19, 26). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 255 (citing Letter from Nathan C. Kingsbury to Attorney General J. C. McReynolds 
(Dec. 19, 1913) reprinted in 1913 AT&T Annual Report); United States v. W. Elec. Co., 531 F. 
Supp. 894, 913 (D. N.J. 1981). 
 55. Catherine Sandoval, Contested Places, Utility Pole Spaces; Safety-Centric Utility Pole 
and Infrastructure Regulation and Competition, ADVANCED WORKSHOP IN REGULATION AND 
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market, expanding beyond the construction rights and utility franchise rights 
granted under California Civil Code § 536.56 
As states and later the federal government increased regulatory oversight 
following Munn v. Illinois in 1876,57 and adopted the Sherman Antitrust Act of 
1890 to restrain anti-competitive conduct,58 JPCs formed outside of the 
government’s purview.  In 1911, the California Constitution was amended to 
vest the California Railroad Commission with “exclusive jurisdiction to 
supervise and regulate public utilities and to prescribe the character and quality 
of the service and fix the compensation therefor.”59  The SCJPC was formed in 
1906, and the NCJPA in 1913, but some of their members have argued that they 
are not subject to state public utility regulation as a private association.60 
JPCs have operated in a jurisdictional fissure by arguing that the association 
is not subject to utility regulation despite the fact that many of their members are 
investor-owned utilities and use or control utility assets.  Subsequent California 
legislation conferred the CPUC with “jurisdiction to regulate . . . electric 
transmission and distribution facilities of publicly owned utilities . . . for the 
limited purpose” of protecting worker and public safety.61  JPCs have adopted 
rules and standards outside of CPUC purview, even as the CPUC adopted 
regulations to promote safety, competitive telecommunications access, and 
reliability.  JPCs remain historical and legal anachronisms that increasingly 
clash with state competition and safety rules, laws, and policies. 
                                                 
 56. CAL. CIV. CODE § 536 (1986) (repealed 1997). 
 57. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876). 
 58. 15 U.S.C.S § 1 (2012) (originally enacted as Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, ch. 647, § 
1 (1890)). 
 59. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 282 P.2d 36, 41 (1955).  See also CAL. CONST. art. 
XII, § 23 (1879) (repealed 1974). 
 60. Comments of California Municipal Utilities Association on Administrative Law Judge’s 
Ruling Requesting Comments on The Role of Joint Pole Associations in Acting as Clearinghouses 
for Pole Location, Ownership, Attachment, and Access Information, Investigation 17-06-027 
(Rulemaking 17-06-028), CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N (Feb. 15, 2019) http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/ 
PublishedDocs/Efile/G000/M273/K147/273147232.PDF [hereinafter CMUA Comments]. 
 61. Decision Adopting Regulations to Enhance Fire Safety in the High Fire-Threat District 
in the Order Instituting Rulemaking to Develop and Adopt Fire-Threat Maps and Fire-Safety 
Regulations, Decision 17-12-024 (Rulemaking 15-05-006), CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N 14 (Dec. 14, 
2017) (citing CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 8002, 8037, & 8056) [hereinafter CPUC D.17-12-024] 
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M200/K976/200976667.PDF; Decision 
Adopting Regulations To Reduce Fire Hazards Associated With Overhead Power Lines And 
Communication Facilities, Decision 12-01-032 (Rulemaking 08-11-005), CAL. PUB. UTIL. 
COMM’N 11 (Jan. 12, 2012), http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/WORD_PDF/ 
FINAL_DECISION/157605.PDF. 
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B.  Establishment of the California Public Utilities Commission, Competitive 
Infrastructure Access, and Rights-of-Way Authorization 
In 1911, through a voter-approved constitutional amendment, the California 
Railroad Commission was added to the California Constitution.62  In 1915, soon 
after the NCJPA was founded, and nearly a decade after the SCJPC’s 
organization, California adopted a law authorizing the California Railroad 
Commission to order access to another utility’s poles, conduits, and rights-of-
way to facilitate competition and service.63  For more than a century, California 
law has recognized the competitive significance of utility pole and right-of-way 
access to the deployment of utility services, and authorized the CPUC to order 
joint use of poles.64 
In 1951, California updated the law authorizing access to rights-of-ways to 
expand telephone and telegraph service and infrastructure.65  Shortly after the 
conclusion of World War II, in 1946, the California legislature renamed the 
Railroad Commission as the California Public Utilities Commission.66  The 1915 
law authorizing the Railroad Commission to order access to other utilities’ 
facilities was updated in 1951 through CA PU Code § 767.67  That legislation 
allows the CPUC to direct the joint use of “all or any part of the conduits, 
subways, tracks, wires, poles, pipes, or other equipment, on, over, or under any 
street or highway, and belonging to another public utility,” where “such use will 
not result in irreparable injury to the owner or other users of such property or 
                                                 
 62. CAL. CONST. art. XII, § 1–6; Anchor Lighting v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 780, 
784 (2006) (citations omitted) (“The CPUC is constitutionally empowered to regulate utilities and 
to fix rates, establish rules, hold various types of hearings, award reparation, and establish its own 
procedures, and legislatively empowered to do ‘all things . . . necessary and convenient in the 
exercise of such power and jurisdiction.’”); CA PU Code 701; CPUC History & Organizational 
Structure, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/history/ (last visited May 10, 2019). 
 63. An Act to Provide for the Organization of the Railroad Commission, ch. 91, § 41, 1915 
Cal. Stat. 136. 
 64. Id. 
 65. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 7901 (1951) (“Telegraph or telephone corporations may 
construct lines of telegraph or telephone lines along and upon any public road or highway, along 
or across any of the waters or lands within this State, and may erect poles, posts, piers, or abutments 
for supporting the insulators, wires, and other necessary fixtures of their lines, in such manner and 
at such points as not to incommode the public use of the road or highway or interrupt the navigation 
of the waters.”). 
 66. CPUC History and Organizational Structure, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N , 
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/history/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2019). 
 67. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 767 (1951) (“Whenever the commission, after a hearing had 
upon its own motion or upon complaint of a public utility affected, finds that public convenience 
and necessity require the use by one public utility of all or any part of the conduits, subways, tracks, 
wires, poles, pipes, or other equipment, on, over, or under any street or highway, and belonging to 
another public utility, and that such use will not result in irreparable injury to the owner or other 
users of such property or equipment or in any substantial detriment to the service, and that such 
public utilities have failed to agree upon such use or the terms and conditions or compensation 
therefor, the commission may by order direct that such use be permitted, and prescribe a reasonable 
compensation and reasonable terms and conditions for the joint use.”). 
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equipment or in any substantial detriment to the service . . . .”68  CA PU Code § 
767 entitles the utility facility or conduit owner to “reasonable compensation and 
reasonable terms and conditions for the joint use.”69  Decades before multiple 
providers of wireless, wireline, Internet, and electric service contested utility 
pole access, California adopted policies to promote competitive access to poles 
and rights-of-way. 
C.  Competition for Utility Pole Access with the Rise of Cable, the 1996 
Telecommunications Act, and the CPUC’s 1998 Rights-of-Way Decision 
Federal law sought to promote utility competition and service to the American 
public through utility pole access beginning in the 1970s.  Congress expanded 
utility pole access to cable companies in 1978 through the Pole Attachments Act 
(47 U.S.C. § 224).70 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 expanded pole attachment rights under 
§ 224 to telecommunications carriers.71  The 1996 Telecommunications Act 
requires that “[a] utility shall provide a cable television system or any 
telecommunications carrier with nondiscriminatory access to any pole, duct, 
conduit, or right-of-way owned or controlled by it.”72  47 U.S.C. § 224 “gave 
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) jurisdiction to regulate the 
rates, terms, and conditions of attachments by cable television operators to the 
poles, conduit or ROW owned or controlled by utilities in the absence of parallel 
state regulation.”73 
Congress allowed states to exercise reverse “preemption” through 47 U.S.C. 
§ 224(c)(1) over FCC jurisdiction of communications infrastructure access.74  
After a state adopts its own utility pole access rules, the FCC loses “jurisdiction 
with respect to rates, terms, and conditions, or access to poles, ducts, conduits, 
and rights-of-way as provided in subsection (f) . . . for pole attachments in any 
case where such matters are regulated by a State.”75  Under 47 U.S.C. § 253, 
states may adopt “on a competitively neutral basis and consistent with Section 
254, requirements necessary to preserve and advance universal service, protect 
the public safety and welfare, ensure the continued quality of 
telecommunications services, and safeguard the rights of consumers.”76  
Furthermore, “section 253 specifically recognizes the authority of state and local 
                                                 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. 47 U.S.C. § 224 (f)(1) (2012). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Order Instituting Rulemaking on the Commission’s Own Motion into Competition for 
Local Exchange Service, Decision 98-10-058, 1998 Cal. PUC LEXIS 879, *7–8 (Cal. P.U.C. 
October 22, 1998) [hereinafter CPUC Decision 98-10-058 or ROW Decision]. 
 74. 47 U.S.C. § 224(c)(1). 
 75. Id. 
 76. CPUC Decision 98-10-058 or ROW Decision, supra note 73, at 10. 
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governments to manage public ROW and to require fair and reasonable 
compensation for the use of such ROW.”77 
The CPUC 1998 ROW Decision 98-10-058 exercised reverse preemption of 
FCC communications infrastructure jurisdiction.  Through the rules adopted in 
Decision 98-10-058, the CPUC “certif[ied] to the FCC that [it] regulate[s] the 
rate, terms, and conditions of access to poles, ducts, conduits, and ROW in 
conformance with §§ 224(c)(2) and (3).”78 
The CPUC’s 1998 ROW Decision 98-10-058 seeks to promote competition 
and allows CLECs to access investor-owned utility poles.79  That decision 
authorized CLECs, competitors to telephone companies, and cable television 
corporations to attach their facilities to jointly or singly owned utility poles.  The 
CPUC’s ROW decision provides “facilities-based competitive local 
communications carriers (CLCs) and cable television (TV) corporations with 
nondiscriminatory access to utility poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way.”80  
The CPUC has since expanded ROW access to other types of services such as 
video providers and commercial mobile radio services. 
The 1998 ROW decision mandates access to certain types of utility 
infrastructure including poles and rights-of-way “owned or controlled by (1) 
large and midsized incumbent local exchange carriers, and (2) major investor-
owned electric utilities.”81  Parties may also enter into voluntary attachment 
arrangements under CA PU Code § 767.7(a)(3).82  Decision 98-10-058 
authorizes the CPUC to arbitrate access disputes.83 
A utility pole attacher is “any person, corporation, or other entity or their 
agents or contractors seeking to permanently or temporarily fasten or affix any 
type of equipment, antenna, line or facility of any kind to a utility pole in the 
right of way or its adjacent ground space.”84  A “Pre–Existing Third Party User” 
is “the owner of any currently operating facilities, antenna, lines or equipment 
on a pole or its adjacent ground space in the right of way,” while a “Pole Owner” 
is “a person, corporation or entity having ownership of a pole or similar structure 
in the right of way to which utilities . . . are located.”85 
                                                 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 12. 
 79. Id. at 1. 
 80. Decision Denying Google Fiber Inc.’s Petition to Modify Decision 07-03-014, 
Rulemaking 06-10-005, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N 2–3 (May 7, 2015) [hereinafter CPUC Decision 
15-05-002] (discussing the scope of the CPUC’s 1998 ROW decision). 
 81. Id. at 3. 
 82. Id. at 23. 
 83. See, e.g., CPUC Final Arbitrator’s Report, Crown Castle PG&E Arbitration, supra note 
7, at 3 n.9. 
 84. BellSouth Telecomms., LLC v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro Gov’t, 275 F. Supp. 3d 
833, 835 (W.D. Ky. 2017) (citation omitted). 
 85. Id. (citation omitted). 
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The CPUC’s Rights of Way decision promotes competition, service, and 
safety by increasing access to utility infrastructure and the property rights 
necessary to reach those facilities.  This decision eliminates the utility pole 
owner’s freedom to refuse to deal with a third party whom the CPUC authorizes 
to attach to a pole.86  The CPUC’s competitive access policies limit a trader’s 
freedom to choose with whom to deal, while the lack of state supervision of the 
JPCs eliminate an antitrust law defense to any allegedly anticompetitive 
activities.87 
The CPUC Pole Census OII describes utility poles as contested spaces with 
significant safety implications.88  The Competition OII Decision recognized that 
“lack of access to poles and conduit is a critical obstacle to making the 
telecommunications market fully competitive.”89  The CPUC’s Competition OII 
Decision found that “[c]ompetitive bottlenecks and barriers to entry, including 
lack of access to poles, conduit and other legacy network infrastructure, limit 
new entrants and may raise prices for some telecommunications services above 
efficiently competitive levels.”90  It expressed concern about utility pole 
associations as a potential competitive bottleneck underscoring “the possibility 
that pole owners, individually or in pole associations, may be in position to 
exercise a type of bottleneck control that has the potential to exclude 
competitors.”91 
CPUC Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Miles’ January 2019 Final 
Arbitrator’s Report regarding CLEC Crown Castle’s petition for CPUC 
arbitration of the dispute about its request to buy utility pole space from PG&E 
observed that, “by virtue of their incumbent status and control over essential 
ROW and bottleneck facilities, ILECs [incumbent local exchange carriers] and 
incumbent electric utilities have a significant bargaining advantage in 
                                                 
 86. See CPUC Decision 98-10-058 or ROW Decision, supra note 73, at 1.  See also United 
States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (“In the absence of any purpose to create or 
maintain a monopoly, the [Sherman] act does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or 
manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent 
discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.  And, of course, he may announce in advance the 
circumstances under which he will refuse to sell.”); cf. United States v. Parke, 362 U.S. 29, 45 
(1960) (“The program upon which Parke Davis embarked to promote general compliance with its 
suggested resale prices plainly exceeded the limitations of the Colgate doctrine and under Beech-
Nut and Bausch & Lomb effected arrangements which violated the Sherman Act . . . .  Parke Davis 
used the refusal to deal with the wholesalers in order to elicit their willingness to deny Parke Davis 
products to retailers and thereby help gain the retailers’ adherence to its suggested minimum retail 
prices.”). 
 87. See Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. LinkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 555 US 438, 448 (2009); Verizon 
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408–11 (2004) (citations 
omitted); Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. at 307. 
 88. CPUC Pole Census OII, supra note 10, at 14–18, 35. 
 89. CPUC Competition OII Decision 16-12-025, supra note 8, at 110. 
 90. Id. at 189. 
 91. Id. at 181. 
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comparison to CLCs [Competitive Local Exchange Carriers].”92  She 
emphasized that “a key principle of the [CPUC 1998] ROW Decision is that 
CLCs should have rights to obtain access to utility poles and support structures 
. . .”93 The CPUC is empowered to protect employee and public safety arising 
from use of utility distribution and transmission poles, including those owned 
by Publicly-Owned Utilities (POUs).94  California law gives the CPUC broad 
authority to regulate IOUs and “do all things” necessary to exercise its power.95   
The CPUC adopted a decision in June 2020 in the utility pole census OII 
requiring the five major utility pole owners in California, Pacific Gas and 
Electric Company, Southern California Edison Company, San Diego Gas & 
Electric Company, Frontier Communications, and AT&T, to submit data on 
utility pole characteristics by June 2021. 96  The pole census and competition OII 
and OIR, I. 17-06-027 and R. 17-06-028 remain open to consider remaining 
issues such as competitive access concerns including JPCs.  This Article urges 
the CPUC to promptly use its authority to examine JPC rules, roles, and risks to 
public safety, competition and reliability. 
III.  SAFETY, RELIABILITY, AND COMPETITION; INTERTWINED VALUES FOR 
UTILITY POLE GOVERNANCE 
Each a Gorgon’s head, which, seized right, Could stun us to stone.97 
- John Updike, “Telephone Poles” 
On utility poles, safety, reliability, and competition meet.98   In 1922, the 
California Railroad Commission adopted General Order (GO) No. 64, regulating 
and authorizing inspection of overhead electric line construction.99  Those rules 
have been revised several times and form part of the CPUC’s rules, orders, 
decisions, and resolutions. 
                                                 
 92. CPUC Final Arbitrator’s Report, Crown Castle PG&E Arbitration, supra note 7, at 6; 
Decision 19-10-037, supra note 7, at 8 (“A key principle of D.98-10-058 (ROW Decision) is that 
CLCs [competitive local exchange carriers] should have rights to obtain access to utility poles and 
support structures at reasonable terms and prices which do not impose a barrier to competition.”) 
 93. Id. 
 94. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 451, 701, 8002, 8037, & 8056 (1951). 
 95. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 701. 
 96. Decision Approving Track 1 Workshop Report Work Plans For San Diego Gas & Electric 
Company, Southern California Gas Company, Pacific Gas And Electric Company, AT&T, and 
Frontier Communications of California, Decision 20-06-004, Investigation 17-06-027, Rulemaking 
17-06-028, 4, June 11, 2020. 
 97. JOHN UPDIKE, TELEPHONE POLES AND OTHER POEMS, supra note 1. 
 98. CPUC Competition OII Decision 16-12-025, supra note 8, at 109–10. 
 99. CPUC General Order 95, supra note 40, at x (citing California Railroad Commission 
General Order 64, adopted May 1, 1922). 
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California Public Utilities Code § 451, first adopted in 1951, vests in the 
CPUC the duty to promote safe, reliable service, at just and reasonable rates, and 
to ensure that regulated entities operate with adequate facilities.100  CA PU Code 
§ 701, also adopted in 1951, vests the CPUC with authority to “supervise and 
regulate every public utility in the State” and provides that the CPUC “may do 
all things, whether specifically designated in this part or in addition thereto, 
which are necessary and convenient in the exercise of such power and 
jurisdiction.”101 
The CPUC’s rule governing overhead electric lines, GO 95, also applies to 
communications lines, utility poles, and attachments.102  GO 95 includes 
“standards for pole ‘loads,’ i.e., the weight and stress on utility poles from 
attachments and weather conditions (e.g., heat, wind), and inspection 
requirements for communications providers.”103  The CPUC adopted GO 95 to 
promote public safety, service reliability, and facilitate competition, as well as 
just and reasonable rates.104 
Utility pole association members include cities, counties, municipal utilities, 
and several investor-owned utilities.  The California Municipal Utilities 
Association (CMUA) argued that the CPUC “does not have broad generalized 
authority beyond public [investor-owned] utilities, and JPAs, such as NCJPA 
and SCJPC, are not public utilities.”105 
The CPUC has broad jurisdiction over investor-owned utilities including 
jurisdiction over IOU electric transmission facilities to protect worker and public 
safety.106  Utility pole attachment, maintenance, access, and administration 
affect safety, competition, reliability, affordability, and achievement of 
California’s environmental and climate change objectives. 
                                                 
 100. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 451 (1977) (amending ch.764, §451, 1951 Cal. Stat. 2036) 
(“Every public utility shall furnish and maintain such adequate, efficient, just, and reasonable 
service, instrumentalities, equipment, and facilities, including telephone facilities, as defined in 
Section 54.1 of the Civil Code, as are necessary to promote the safety, health, comfort, and 
convenience of its patrons, employees, and the public.”). 
 101. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 701. 
 102. CPUC General Order 95, supra note 40, at xi, III-16. 
 103. Mulqueen, Brief Introduction to Utility Poles, supra note 2, at 6. 
 104. CPUC General Order 95, supra note 40, at x, xii, xiv–xv, E-2. 
 105. CMUA Comments, supra note 60. 
 106. CAL. CONST. art. XII, §§ 1–9; CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 451, 701; Utilities and 
Industries, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/utilitiesindustries/ (last visited Sept. 
15, 2019) (“The CPUC regulates privately owned electric, natural gas, telecommunications, water, 
and transportation companies.  The CPUC also regulates the safety of both publicly and privately 
owned railroad and rail transit companies/agencies, and rail crossings.  The CPUC serves the public 
interest by protecting consumers and ensuring the provision of safe, reliable utility service and 
infrastructure at reasonable rates, with a commitment to environmental enhancement and a healthy 
California economy.”); CMUA Comments, supra note 60; CPUC D.17-12-024, supra note 61, at 
14 (citing CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 8002, 8037, 8056). 
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A.  The Role of JPCs in Just and Reasonable Rates 
JPCs also affect affordability and rates.  SCE’s 2015 General Rate Case 
(GRC) application proposed to accelerate utility pole maintenance or 
replacement to improve safety and reliability.107  Proceeding participant, The 
Utility Reform Network (TURN) observed that the SCJPC, “of which SCE is 
one of 33 members,” plays a role “in setting the rates for pole replacement and 
other costs.”108  SCE’s GRC application forecasted “$20.083 million in credits 
from joint users” for utility pole replacement, approximately 10% of the cost of 
proposed replacements.109  The CPUC’s GRC authorization directed SCE to 
“negotiate with joint users to reach efficient sharing of joint poles and safely 
provide electric service.”110 
The CPUC’s 2015 SCE GRC decision emphasized 
. . . SCE and joint owners and renters should all recognize that we 
believe the costs of remediating overloaded joint poles should be 
allocated approximately in proportion to the causes of the overloading.  
SCE should seek to quantify the causes of pole loading, and attribute 
those causes among SCE, joint owners, and renters.111 
The Commission directed SCE to “develop solutions to remediate overloading 
while avoiding an allocation of costs that results in SCE ratepayers bearing a 
disproportionate share” and encouraged “SCE and other interested parties to 
expeditiously address these issues.”112  The CPUC’s decision recognizes joint 
pole owners’s responsibility for safety and reliability, and the relationship of 
pole attachments and rule compliance to rates. 
PG&E reported in September 2019 that it had not recovered any contribution 
from any NCJPA member for the $3.5 million in costs that PG&E incurred for 
the work on hazardous trees near jointly-owned poles.113  PG&E’s GRC witness 
William Pender explained that PG&E’s contract with AT&T for “cost recovery” 
for expenses related to jointly owned poles expired in 2011 and has not been 
renewed.114  Pender reported that “AT&T informally agreed in an email 
exchange to reimburse PG&E approximately $700,000 for certain hazardous 
                                                 
 107. See Decision on Test Year 2015 General Rate Case for Southern California Edison 
Company, Decision 15-11-02, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N at 131-32 (Nov. 5, 2015) 
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tree removal work on jointly owned poles performed in both 2012 and 2013.”115  
As Pender indicated, “[b]ased on AT&T’s past practice of accepting its allocated 
share of hazard tree removal work, PG&E had an expectation that AT&T would 
continue to pay its allocated share for work performed upon receipt of an 
invoice.”116 
After years of waiting for payments from AT&T which never arrived, PG&E 
cancelled $3.5 million in aging unpaid invoices in 2017 for work it believed was 
attributable to joint pole ownership expenses “in accordance with accounting 
guidelines for ageing unpaid invoices.”117  PG&E’s witness, Pender, reported 
that NCJPA “requires a special agreement between the joint owners for recovery 
for hazardous tree removal costs.”118  As PG&E explained, NCJPA leaves 
expense allocation to pole owners by requiring such agreements.119 
CPUC General Order 95 provides rules governing electric lines, poles, and 
attachments.120  Vegetation management and clearance requirements adopted 
through CPUC General Order 95 apply to “all overhead electrical supply and 
communication facilities that are covered by this General Order.”121  Each party 
owning or attaching to a pole is responsible for vegetation management and 
utility pole safety and reliability.122 
The CPUC’s 2006 Decision 06-08-030 ended rate regulation for incumbent 
telephone companies, except for designated rural telcos regulated through a 
separate framework and fund.123  That CPUC decision aspired to create 
incentives for competition and innovation124 through rate regulation repeal for 
large telecommunications carriers. 
                                                 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. CPUC General Order 95, supra note 40, at I-3. 
 121. Id. at III-19. 
 122. See id. at III-19–III-20. 
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National Rural Telecom Ass’n v. F.C.C., 988 F.2d 174, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“[b]ecause a firm 
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unresponsive to price changes). See Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, 
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Rate deregulation does not end the obligation of telecommunications 
companies to provide safe and reliable service at just and reasonable rates with 
adequate facilities under CA PU Code § 451.125  CPUC General Order 95 
specifically applies to communications as well as electric companies.126 Rate 
deregulation renders costs to comply with CPUC rules such as GO 95 not 
directly recoverable through rates. Instead, companies must absorb those costs 
or pass them onto consumers in prices. 
Rate deregulation does not excuse failure to comply with CPUC rules.  
Neither does it justify shifting regulatory compliance and safety costs to electric 
companies and their ratepayers or shareholders. 
This Article recommends the CPUC act to ensure that electric ratepayers are 
not saddled with bills attributable to other joint pole owners or attachers.  
PG&E’s bankruptcy underscores the imperative of examining the write-off of 
$3.5 million in shared utility pole compliance costs.  The CPUC has the authority 
and duty to analyze rate-shifting and rule compliance to protect public safety 
and ensure that rates remain just and reasonable. 
B.  CPUC Utility Pole Safety Regulation and JPCs 
CPUC regulation of utility poles and attachments has increased since utility 
infrastructure maintenance and operation caused several major wildfires in 
2007.127  On “October 21, 2007, three wooden utility poles broke and fell to the 
ground, and the downed lines sparked . . . [a] vegetation fire” which became the 
Malibu Canyon fire.128  In its 2008 adoption of rules to reduce fire hazards 
associated with utility poles, attachments, and overhead wires, the CPUC 
stressed the urgency of addressing safety issues as recent “wildfires in California 
may have been linked to electric and communications facilities and have resulted 
in widespread destruction.”129 
The CPUC’s Safety and Enforcement Division (SED) reported that violations 
of CPUC rules contributed to the Malibu Canyon fire, emphasizing: “(1) the 
utility poles were not in compliance with GO 95; (2) if they had been in 
compliance with GO 95 they would have been able to withstand the wind gusts; 
and (3) that violations of GO 95 were the direct cause of the Malibu Canyon 
Fire.”130  The CPUC’s Malibu Canyon Fire investigation found “instances of 
                                                 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 4 FCC Rcd 2873, 2924 (1989). Third, rate-of-return regulation is 
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 125. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 451 (1977) (amending ch.764, §451, 1951 Cal. Stat. 2036). 
 126. CPUC General Order 95, supra note 40, at III-19. 
 127. Mulqueen, Brief Introduction to Utility Poles, supra note 2, at 5. 
 128. Id. at 14. 
 129. Order Instituting Rulemaking to Revise & Clarify Comm’n Regulations Relating to the 
Safety of Elec. Util. & Communications Infrastructure Provider Facilities, No. D. 09-08-029, 2009 
WL 2910747 (Aug. 20, 2009). 
 130. Mulqueen, A Brief Introduction to Utility Poles, supra note 2, at 14  (citing I.09-01-018, 
Incident Investigation Report, October 21, 2008 (Attachment), at A-7). 
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parties: placing attachments on poles after being denied permission by the pole 
owner; using SCJPC rules to evade compliance with GO 95; and failing to fully 
respond to Commission investigations.”131 
The CPUC’s 1998 ROW Decision prohibits unauthorized pole attachments, 
establishes a fine for unauthorized attachments, and provides notice that the 
Commission may impose additional sanctions.132  Fires associated with utility 
pole attachment, maintenance, and administration highlight the imperative of the 
CPUC’s safety function and regulations. 
CPUC Decision 13-09-026 criticized respondent telecommunications carriers 
in the Malibu Canyon Fire investigation who used “SCJPC rules to evade 
compliance with GO 95.”133  CPUC’s SED alleged that “at least one of the poles 
which fell and ignited the Malibu Canyon Fire was overloaded in violation of 
General Order (GO) 95 and California Public Utilities Code Section 451 (Pub. 
Util. Code § 451).”134  According to the SED, the respondents’ interpreted 
SCJPC rules “in a way that neglected compliance with GO 95,” contributed to 
the substandard pole.135 
In its analysis of the Malibu Canyon Fire investigation, the CPUC approved a 
settlement that stipulated wireless carrier “NextG used SCJPC procedures to 
request permission to attach facilities to Pole 252E.  SCE denied the request 
based on SCE’s determination that NextG’s proposed attachment would 
overload the pole.”136  Later, “NextG contested the determination.  After 
additional communications between NextG and SCE over an 11-month period, 
SCE again denied the proposed attachment.”137  In response, NextG inform[ed] 
SCE that it could not deny the request per Section 18.1-D of the SCJPC Routine 
Handbook, which provides that a proposed attachment is automatically approved 
if no protest or other request for review is received within 45 days.”138  The 
CPUC NextG Settlement Agreement “stipulates that the . . . chain of events 
[leading to the Malibu Canyon fire] supports ‘the conclusion that the SCJPC 
process . . . was not conducive to ensuring that the subject poles were GO 95 
compliant.”139 
The CPUC’s Malibu Canyon fire investigation and NextG settlement did not 
evaluate the SCJPC’s role in safety, reliability, and the CPUC’s exercise of its 
                                                 
 131. Id. at 15. 
 132. CPUC Decision 98-10-058 or ROW Decision, supra note 73, Appendix A, Section VI.D 
(Unauthorized Attachments). 
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responsibilities.  Neither did the CPUC examine whether JPC rules and functions 
were consistent with GO 95 or CPUC safety and competitive access rules.  In a 
2017 update of GO 95 rules to accelerate the required timeframe to address GO 
95 violations, several JPC members commented that “rules prohibiting 
unauthorized attachments already exist in contracts between parties, the 
Commission’s Right-of-Way Rules (“ROW Rules”), 
the Northern California Joint Pole Association Routine Handbook, and the 
Southern California Joint Pole Committee Routine Handbook.”140 
JPC handbooks are not submitted for CPUC review.  They neither provide a 
basis for assessing compliance with CPUC safety rules and standards, nor does 
the CPUC owe any deference to JPC handbooks, rules, or procedures.  The 
CPUC’s NextG Decision highlights the safety and reliability risks of JPC rules 
and their unsupervised function.  Analyzing whether the JPC’s role and rules 
protect safety requires public transparency about JPC rules and conduct. 
In 2015, the CPUC’s SED issued a citation against PG&E for failing to 
maintain vegetation near overhead electric lines, a failure that CalFire found 
caused the Butte fire in Calaveras and Amador Counties in California on 
September 9, 2015.141  Situated in a high fire threat area ranked as Tier 2 fire 
risk, the Butte Fire “burned more than 70,000 acres (106 square miles), 
destroyed an estimated 921 structures, and resulted in two fatalities” in 
September 2015.142 
The CPUC updated GO 95 in December 2017 to protect public safety and 
promote prompt compliance with the CPUC’s rules by adding protocols and 
priority for utility infrastructure in high fire threat areas.143  Following the 
devastating wildfires in 2017, the CPUC imposed a 60 month timeline to address 
Level 3 risks—defined as an acceptable safety or reliability risk, but a violation 
of CPUC GO 95—a category that previously had no set deadline.144  In May 
2018, following the destructive 2017 wildfire season that included the Wine 
Country and Ventura County fires,145 the CPUC adopted Decision 18-05-042 to 
shorten to 36 months the time allowed to address Level 2 safety or reliability 
                                                 
 140. CPUC D.17-12-024, supra note 61, at 39. 
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issues for utility pole attachments (classified as non-immediate, high to low risk 
to safety or reliability).146 
The California Department of Fire and Forestry (CalFire) Investigation of the 
2017 Wine Country fires found that PG&E infrastructure and operations caused 
17 of those fires.147  CalFire found that the Sulfur Fire in Lake County was 
caused by utility pole failure, but has provided no public details to date on the 
pole failure cause.148  My faculty blog post observed in January 2019 that 
“[n]either Cal Fire nor the CPUC’s reports to date have explained why the utility 
pole failed in Lake County.  Neither have they explained the cause of the electric 
distribution issue in the Sonoma County “37fire.”149  My blog recommended the 
CPUC “announce its process to examine the cause of these failures and take 
immediate steps to make sure they are not replicated” to avoid public safety 
threats such as Southern California Edison’s report that it appeared that a 
telecommunications lashing wire may have hit an electric line, sparking the 
Silverado fire in Orange County, California in October 2020.150  Such analysis 
and explanation by the CPUC and CalFire is urgently needed to ensure public 
safety as climate change lengthens fire season and ferocious fires threaten public 
safety. 
Throughout my six-year term as a CPUC Commissioner from January 2011 
to January 2017, I highlighted the imperative of CPUC action to promote utility 
pole and attachment safety, as well as competition, service reliability, 
affordability, access to utility service, and achievement of California’s 
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environmental goals.151  I led several utility pole tours during my service as a 
CPUC Commissioner and organized a pole tour in 2018 after rejoining 
academia.152  Ivan Penn, writing for the New York Times, described the utility 
pole tour I organized in the San Jose, California area in May 2018: 
 On a recent walking tour in San Jose, the state’s third-most populous 
city, a former state regulator showed the issues that are raised when 
the wooden poles that hold power lines and communication cables are 
not attended to.  Some cable lines dangled in front of houses.  Workers 
had tied some wires to the poles with rope—a violation noted by the 
tour’s guides.  Power lines ran through thickets of trees to connect to 
houses.  Some resembled odd Christmas trees, with wires, a street 
lamp, a cable box and ropes, all supported by a single pole.  And even 
with the array of things connected to the poles, some lack proper 
support.  A wire from one pole along the route had even caused a brush 
fire next to a home when it fell to the ground in April. ‘Overloaded 
poles have caused wildfires,’ said Catherine Sandoval, the former 
regulator who had organized the tour.153 
Regulatory, academic, and public scrutiny of JPC standards, rules, and 
procedures is critical to public safety as “pegs,” or “buddy poles”—portions of 
old poles left attached to new poles—create safety hazards and thwart 
competitive access to utility poles.154  
CalFire determined that facilities on PG&E’s aging transmission pole, planted 
in 1919 when Woodrow Wilson was President of the United States, caused the 
Camp Fire that killed 84 people, caused grevious bodily injury to two other 
civilians and a fire fighter, and destroyed more than 18,800 structures in and 
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near Paradise, California in November of 2018.155  PG&E’s February 2019 
Securities and Exchange Commission filing disclosed “it is probable that its 
equipment will be determined to be an ignition point of the 2018 Camp Fire.”156  
PG&E reported “a broken C-hook attached to the separated suspension insulator 
that had connected the suspension insulator to a tower arm, along with wear at 
the connection point.  In addition, a flash mark was observed on [the] Tower,” 
which is believed to be the Camp Fire’s ignition point.157  In May 2019, CalFire 
confirmed that PG&E’s electrical transmission lines caused the Camp Fire, 
California’s deadliest and most destructive fire.158  The magnitude of loss of life 
and destruction in the Camp Fire underscores the need for searching analysis of 
utility infrastructure governance and management, including examination of 
JPC rules and function. 
PG&E’s Wildfire Safety Plan filed in February 2019 underscores the 
importance of utility poles and the facilities attached to them as drivers of 
wildfire risk and safety issues.159  PG&E identified the major drivers of 414 fire 
events between 2015-2017 and reported that vegetation contact with conductors 
(electric wires) attached to utility poles was the primary wildfire driver, causing 
49% of ignitions.160  Conductor failure drove 11% of ignitions; failures of “line 
equipment, such as: poles, insulators, transformers, and capacitors” drove 11% 
of ignitions; while equipment failure including conductors, splices between 
segments of wire, and other connecting hardware drove 5% of ignitions.161  All 
of this equipment is attached to utility poles, and pole failures can cause fires 
and other hazards. 
PG&E’s 2020 GRC application proposed to replace 940 overloaded poles 
between 2018 and 2022 at a projected cost of $15.6 million.162  PG&E 
Workpapers supporting this proposal did not explain why those poles were 
overloaded.  PG&E stated that its proposal was “targeting poles that are 
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potentially overloaded or significantly degraded and not expected to pass their 
next intrusive inspection, based on increasing degradation discovered during the 
previous inspection.”163  To address the confluence of high wildfire risk and 
overloaded poles PG&E proposed that Tier 3 High Fire Threat District areas “are 
the first priority for accelerated retirement, to minimize additional risk of these 
poles failing prematurely in-service.”164 
PG&E reported to the CPUC in 2018 that most of its utility poles are more 
than forty years old.165  In 2018 PG&E had 2.247 million wooden utility poles 
in its territory: 979,805 of which were under 40 years old; 1,151,768 were over 
40 years old; and PG&E reported that no age information was available for 
128,853 wooden poles.166  The life of a distribution pole “is generally considered 
to be on the order of 40 years,” according to PG&E’s 2016 GRC testimony.167  
Despite PG&E’s understanding of a distribution pole’s expected life of service, 
more than 1.2 million of PG&E’s poles were over 40 years old or lacked any age 
information.168 
In addition to pole age, pole overloading and maintenance can create safety 
and reliability risks.  As the CPUC emphasized, “[o]verloaded poles present a 
significant safety hazard and reliability risk.”169  The CPUC’s 2015 unanimous 
approval of SCE’s GRC in Decision 15-11-021 found that “nearly 19%, of poles 
reviewed in SCE’s PLP [Pole Loading Program] study are overloaded, and 
specifically failed the bending analysis.  The study suggests similar failure rates 
in SCE’s total population of poles.  SCE proposes to replace these poles.”170  
Decision 15-11-021 noted that “3% of poles in the study are overloaded and 
could be repaired through addition or repair of guy wires.”171 
With increased fire risk in California due to climate change,172 and after more 
than 5 years of drought between 2012 and 2016173 which fueled fires through 
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diseased trees and dry brush even after the drought ended, it is imperative that 
the CPUC review JPC roles and rules.  The CPUC must examine the JPC 
process, its membership rules, unpublished handbooks, and function, and take 
appropriate steps to protect public and worker safety. 
Lack of public access to JPC rules stymies competitive access, limits 
regulatory effectiveness, and creates public safety risks.  The Competitive 
Telecommunications Association (CALTEL) commented in June 2019 that 
most of its members lease pole access and are not joint owners.174  CALTEL 
emphasized that “while some of these members may have access to Joint Pole 
Association process and procedure documentation, this information is not 
publicly available.”175  CALTEL argued that two years after the CPUC opened 
the utility pole census and competitive access proceeding “no progress has been 
made to improve competitive access to poles and conduits.  CALTEL members 
continue to face significant delays and excessive costs in ways that both 
associations have explained extensively in prior comments.”176 
The JPCs’ lack of state or other government supervision creates safety risks 
the CPUC, insurance regulators, and California’s legislature and Governor must 
evaluate.  PG&E’s insurance was insufficient to cover its 2017-2018 liabilities 
for fires associated with its infrastructure maintenance and operation.177  Fire 
risks have driven up rates for homeowners and businesses in high wildfire 
danger areas, leading some companies to cancel homeowner policies.178  JPCs 
erect barriers to regulation and utility operation, fueling  safety and insurance 
risks. 
A homeowner can clear the brush near her house to reduce fire risks to her 
home.  A utility pole wrapped in dead vines stretching into the pole’s electric 
space such as a pole I observed in May 2019 in a Tier 3 high wildfire danger 
area of Los Gatos, California creates fire, electric, 9-1-1 and communications 
access risks a homeowner cannot mitigate.  The utility pole tour I organized in 
May of 2018 with the CPUC revealed many more examples of poor utility pole 
maintenance, safety, and reliability risks in plain view on San Jose, California’s 
sidewalks.179 
                                                 
 174. Reply Comments of The California Association of Competitive Telecommunications 
Companies on ALJ’s Ruling Requesting Comments on Right of Way Rules, CAL. PUB. UTIL. 
COMM’N 3 (June 24, 2019), http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Efile/G000/M309/ 
K755/309755415.PDF [hereinafter CALTEL Reply Comments, ALJ Ruling, ROW]. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Will Wade & Katherine Chinglinsk, PG&E’s $1.4B in Wildfire Insurance May Not Be 
Enough, But Was ‘Regular Amount’, Ins. J. (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.insurancejournal.com/ 
news/west/2018/11/20/509843.htm. 
 178. Sophie Quinton, As Wildfire Risk Increases, Home Insurance Is Harder to Find, PEW 
(Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2019/01/03/as-
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 179. See Sandoval, Comments for CPUC Utility Pole Census OII, supra note 152; Sandoval, 
Principles for Utility Regulation in the Face of Increasing Wildfire Risk, supra note 19. 
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Utility pole owners and users have a legal duty to address and mitigate safety.  
The CPUC, IOUs, JPCs and their members, California’s insurance 
commissioner, legislature, and Governor must promptly analyze and address 
these risks.  That risk analysis should begin with examination of JPC functions 
and rules. 
The following section analyzes public information about JPC roles and 
competitive significance.  The CPUC’s request for comment on the JPC’s 
function and what, if any, role they should play in a utility pole census and 
database, accentuates the CPUC’s lack of supervision over the JPCs. 
IV.  JPC INCUMBENT VETO RULES ADOPTED BY THE NCJPA DURING THE 
CPUC 1998 RIGHTS-OF-WAY PROCEEDING 
Our eyes, washed clean of belief180 
- John Updike, “Telephone Poles” 
A.  NCJPA 1998 Agreement Adopts Supermajority Quorum and Voting 
Requirements to Consider New  Members 
During the pendency of the CPUC’s ROW proceeding and prior to the 
CPUC’s October 1998 ROW decision, the NCJPA adopted a new agreement in 
January 1998 replacing its 1960 “Black Book.”181  The 1998 NCJPA agreement 
imposed a supermajority quorum and voting requirement for consideration and 
approval of new members.182  NCJPA’s 1998 agreement ensured that 
incumbents could exercise veto power over prospective members regardless of 
any rules the CPUC adopted to foster competitive access in the ROW 
proceeding. 
The City and County of San Francisco, a NCJPA member, posted the NCJPA 
1998 Agreement on the internet through the City’s Bureau of Public Works.183  
The SCJPC articles of incorporation, by-laws, and other governance documents 
have not been made public.  The JPCs’ lack of non-profit status or government 
sanction for their role casts a veil over JPC rules and functions.  Utility pole 
association members include several investor-owned utilities providing electric 
and communications services, local governments, and municipal utility 
districts.184  PG&E is a NCJPA member, SCE is a SCJPC member, while San 
Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E) is not a JPC member.185  JPC members include 
                                                 
 180. JOHN UPDIKE, TELEPHONE POLES AND OTHER POEMS, supra note 1. 
 181. NCJPA Agreement, supra note 20, at 1. 
 182. Id. § 7(a), at 9. 
 183. Id. at 21. 
 184. Simms, supra note 21, at 4. 
 185. Comments Of Southern California Edison Company (U 338-E) On ALJ Mason’s January 
31, 2019 Ruling Requesting Comments On The Role Of Joint Pole Associations In Acting As 
Clearinghouses For Pole Location, Ownership, Attachment, And Access Information, 
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major telecommunications and internet carriers including AT&T, Frontier, and 
Comcast, and many CLECs.186  The CPUC’s 2020 decision in the utility pole 
census proceeding notes that “SDG&E, SCE, PG&E, Frontier, and AT&T are 
the five pole owners who, collectively, own between 85-90% of the 6+ million 
electric and communication utility poles in California.” 
This Article contends that the NCJPA’s supermajority quorum and voting 
requirements, as well as other aspects of the JPC process and function, thwart 
the intent of the CPUC’s 1998 ROW decision to promote competitive access to 
utility poles.  NCJPA and SCJPC member comments to the CPUC indicate that 
JPC membership is critical to utility pole access and maintenance necessary to 
offer communications and electric service.  Analysis of the NCJPA’s quorum 
and voting rules, and JPC organizational function, highlight the JPCs’ 
competitive significance and concerns about their effect on competition, safety, 
and reliability. 
B.  NCJPA Supermajority Quorum and Rules to Consider New Members 
To consider and approve a new membership application, NCJPA rules require 
a quorum of at least three fourths (3/4) of all the Parties of the Association and 
a vote in favor of the motion by at least three fourths (3/4) of all such Parties.187  
The absence of enough incumbent members prevents formation of a quorum and 
stalls a new member’s application until a quorum is formed.  The NCJPA 
agreement provides, “[e]ach Party shall have one representative on the 
Administrative Board, and each representative shall have one vote.”188 
The Association requires that a “[q]uorum must be present before the 
Association may conduct official business,” and defines a quorum for the 
consideration of new business as representation of at least 3/4 of all the 
association’s members.189  A majority vote is only available for matters noticed 
10 days in advance of the meeting or if that “same matter was discussed at the 
last meeting and is being acted upon as unfinished business at a duly convened 
meeting, of the Administrative Board.”190 
Per the NCJPA agreement, “[n]o new business may be brought up at a meeting 
and finally passed upon at the same meeting unless at least three fourths (3/4) of 
                                                 
Investigation17-06-027, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N 2 (Feb. 15, 2019) (“Like other members, SCE 
relies on SCJPC records for pole locations, ownership and equity interest information, and the 
processing of financial transactions.”) [hereinafter SCE Comments, ALJ Ruling, Pole Census OII]; 
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Associations In Acting As Clearinghouses For Pole Location, Ownership, Attachment, And Access 
Information, Investigation 17-06-027, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N 1 (Feb. 15, 2019); Facts about 
PG&E Pole Management and Maintenance, CURRENTS, https://www.pgecurrents.com/2017/ 
11/08/facts-about-pge-pole-management-and-maintenance/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2017). 
 186. Simms, supra note 21, at 4. 
 187. NCJPA Agreement, supra note 20, § 7(a), at 9. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
2020] Utility Pole Association Rules, Roles, and Risks 503 
all the Parties of the Association are represented and at least three fourths (3/4) 
of all such Parties vote in favor thereof.”191  A membership application 
constitutes new business, triggering the requirement of a quorum of 3/4 of all of 
the parties to the agreement, unless discussed at the previous meeting.  New 
business requires a vote in favor of admission by 3/4 of the members.  The 
supermajority quorum and voting requirement pose high barriers to membership 
and utility pole access for NCJPA applicants. 
NCJPA applies this supermajority standard to proposals to amend its 
agreement, including new membership criteria or administrative practices and 
policies. 
 The affirmative vote of at least three quarters (3/4) of the Parties, 
which may be by written consent delivered within six (6) months of 
the initial action of the Administrative Board on such matter, is 
required to amend this Agreement, adopt or modify the By-Laws, or 
make changes in the Membership or administrative practices and 
policies.192 
The requirement for a vote of three quarters of the members to change the by-
laws, organization’s agreement, or voting procedure erects high barriers to 
making those changes. 
CPUC Communications Division staff member Robert Wullenjohn reported 
to the CPUC in 2016 that major members of the NCJPA, including PG&E, 
AT&T, and NCJPA, agreed to change some of NCJPA’s membership forms to 
conform to CPUC eligibility rules for pole attachment.193  Wullenjohn reported 
that the NCJPA had difficulty convening a supermajority quorum to hold a vote 
to consider changes the utilities’ regulator recommended.194 
NCJPA membership is open only to “a Utility which conducts business within 
the Operating Boundaries . . .”195  NCJPA’s 1998 agreement defines a utility as: 
 A governmental or private entity or federally regulated cooperative 
which uses poles in the provision of communications, electric power, 
transportation or other utility services for sale or resale to the public, 
directly or indirectly, and, if a private entity, holds all necessary 
federal, state or local authorizations, such as a Certificate of Public 
Convenience and Necessity (“CPCN”) from the California Public 
Utilities Commission (“CPUC”).196 
                                                 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. § 7(b), at 10. 
 193. California Public Utilities Commission, Voting Meeting, ADMINMONITOR 2:07:00–
2:17:00 (Sept. 29, 2016), http://www.adminmonitor.com/ca/cpuc/voting_meeting/20160929/ 
[hereinafter CPUC 2016 Voting Meeting, NCJPA Report]. 
 194. Id. 
 195. NCJPA Agreement, supra note 20, § 6(A), at 6. 
 196. Id. § 2(x), at 3. 
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NCJPA requires prospective new members to furnish NCJPA with “proof of 
federal, state or local authorization, such as a CPCN, if required.”197  NCJPA 
also requires new members to have appropriate insurance, agree to the 
membership rules upon admission, pay the application fee and assessments, and 
“[m]aintain the personnel, equipment and resources necessary for the repair, 
maintenance or replacement of its facilities on Jointly Owned Poles or furnish 
proof that it has contracted for such services, with an entity or entities approved 
by the Administrative Board.”198 
NCJPA limits membership to entities licensed by the state or federal 
government to offer utility services and occupy pole space.199  These criteria 
recognize the threshold role of government regulation in determining who can 
occupy utility pole space.  Yet, NCJPA’s new membership quorum, voting 
requirements, and membership criteria subject prospective pole occupants to 
conditions created through incumbent pole owners’ and occupants’ agreement. 
NCJPA’s rules and procedures can delay prospective members’ access to 
utility poles necessary to deploy competitive services.  Delay or failure to grant 
JPC membership limits ability to participate in JPC cost and information sharing 
and the JPC standard-setting process.  The requirement for JPC membership to 
access the information and procedures maintained and developed by the JPCs 
reveals their competitive significance.  Through agreements between incumbent 
competitors, JPCs act as gatekeepers to California’s utility pole access market. 
The CPUC should promptly examine whether such concerted action by 
incumbents is inconsistent with CPUC decisions promoting competitive access, 
safety, and reliability.  State and federal competition authorities should examine 
whether these agreements and JPC functions violate state and federal antitrust 
and unfair competition laws. 
C.  Supermajority Quorum and Voting Requirements for Prospective New 
Members Restrict Pole Access, Raising Utility Regulation and Antitrust 
Concerns 
CPUC rules create a duty for utilities who own utility poles, including 
telecommunications companies, to deal with rivals and third-parties the 
government deems eligible to attach to utility poles.200  Agreement between 
competitors to raise barriers to access for a competitive resource deemed open 
to competitors by the regulator raises antitrust concerns under Sherman Act 
Section 1 which prohibits conspiracies in restraint of trade.201  The CPUC and 
                                                 
 197. Id. § 6(B)(4), at 8. 
 198. Id. §§ 6(a)–(b), at 6–8. 
 199. Id. § 2(x), at 3. 
 200. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 709 (1993). 
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the California Attorney General’s Office should examine whether JPC rules and 
function are inconsistent with California’s policies to promote competitive 
access to utility poles, as well as CPUC safety rules. 
Firms with a regulatory duty to deal with competitors cannot escape that duty 
by placing assets under the veto power and effective control of an association of 
incumbent competitors.  Through competitors’ collective action, JPC 
membership rules erect barriers to accessing an asset the utility regulator gives 
them permission to use.202  Such conduct limits consumers’ ability to realize 
competition’s benefits. 
NCJPA’s supermajority voting requirements resemble terms recognized as so 
anticompetitive that associations such as the Associated Press and Realty Multi-
List, Inc. dropped similar terms before a federal antitrust trial.203  Nearly one 
hundred years after Samuel Morse first used wooden poles to support telegraph 
lines and service,204 the by-laws of the Associated Press faced scrutiny under the 
Sherman Antitrust Act adopted in 1890.205  The Associated Press by-laws gave 
incumbent members “veto power over the applications of a publisher who was 
or would be in competition with the old member,” a veto that could be 
overridden only by a vote of four-fifths of all the members.206 
The Supreme Court’s 1945 Associated Press v. U.S. decision held that 
“arrangements or combinations designed to stifle competition cannot be 
immunized by adopting a membership device accomplishing that purpose.”207  
Associated Press condemned “restrictive clauses on admissions to membership” 
and rules that “prevented service of AP news to non-members.”208 
Competitors and firms vying for access to the same critical competitive 
resource ̶ utility poles ̶ face the barriers erected by NCJPA’s supermajority 
quorum and voting rules.  Concerted action to develop and implement those 
rules  raises questions about whether JPCs have violated Sherman Act § 1 
through: (1) a combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade and commerce in 
news among the states, or (2) an attempt to monopolize a part of that trade. 
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NCJPA’s rules do not expressly prevent dealing with non-members as AP’s 
rules did.  NCJPA rules, however, allow a minority of incumbents to block new 
competitors from joining by failing to attend a voting meeting so a quorum is 
not formed and the voting requirement for new member admission is not met.  
Neither public utility law nor competition law entitle JPCs or its members to 
thwart CPUC competitive access policies and safety rules.  NCJPA and SCJPC 
rules merit scrutiny under state public utility law, federal antitrust  and state 
competition law that prohibits unfair business practices.209  
D.  JPCs Lack Non-Profit Status, Are Not Government Agencies, and Are Not 
Actively Supervised by the CPUC or Any State Agency 
The rules and function of the JPCs have been difficult for non-members and 
regulators to discern since the JPCs operating in California are not incorporated 
as non-profits whose bylaws and reports are publicly accessible.  Neither are the 
JPCs government run or supervised.  NCJPA’s 1998 Agreement defines the 
organization as “[t]he 1998 Northern California joint Pole Association: A non-
profit organization to be formed and supported by the Parties to accomplish the 
purposes set forth herein.”210  The City of San Francisco adopted an ordinance 
on October 29, 2007 joining the NCJPA’s 1998 agreement.211  That ordinance 
described the NCJPA as a “non-profit association of electrical utilities, 
telephone companies, cable television providers, irrigation and utility districts, 
and municipal utilities whose sole purpose is to administer the shared ownership, 
maintenance, use, setting, replacement, dismantling, abandonment or removal 
of jointly owned utility poles.”212 
More than twenty-three years after the 1998 NCJPA’s agreement’s adoption, 
the NCJPA has not submitted a public filing with any state to form a non-profit.  
A search of the ProPublica database, the California Secretary of the State’s 
Office website, and the California Attorney General’s website in December 
2018, September 2019, and June and December 2020, and February 2021 found 
no non-profit organizations in the name of NCJPA, nor SCJPC, with or without 
abbreviation.213  If JPCs were non-profits their by-laws and other reports would 
be publicly available to provide operational transparency and tax-exemption 
eligibility. 
SCJPC has filed federal taxes for several years, and links to its returns since 
2004 are available on the ProPublica database.214  ProPublica reports that SCJPC 
                                                 
 209. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16700 (commonly known as the Cartwright Act); CAL. 
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filed taxes as a non-profit under tax code designation 501(C)(12), applicable to 
“irrigation companies, telephone companies, etc., which have a mutually 
beneficial nature.”215  Yet, a search of the California Attorney General’s and 
California Secretary of State’s Office websites found no non-profit registration 
for SCJPC,216 a prerequisite to a non-profit tax exemption for state taxes.  The 
absence of state non-profit status raises a question about whether the SCJPC 
owes California state taxes, or claims some other exemption from filing and 
reporting requirements. 
No federal or state tax filings were found for NCJPA or under the name of the 
Northern California Joint Pole Association through a search of the ProPublica 
website on September 9, 2019 and on June 11, 2020, December 26, 2020, and 
February 6, 2021.217  Since NCJPA does not appear to be registered as a non-
profit with the State of California, a prerequisite to non-profit tax-exempt status 
for California taxes,218 the absence of such filings raises questions about whether 
NCJPA owes federal and state taxes. 
NCJPA represented itself to the CPUC in March 2017 as a “non-profit 
organization formedto [sic] be formed,”219 though the NCJPA had not filed for 
non-profit status.  NCJPA Interim Operations Manager, Tina Simms stated in 
her remarks and PowerPoint presentation in March 2017 at the CPUC workshop 
on utility poles that NCJPA was “[a] non-profit organization formedto [sic] be 
formed and supported by the Parties [Members] to accomplish the purposes 
[Cost Sharing] set forth within the Agreement.”220  Simms’ characterization of 
the NCJPA as “formedto [sic] be formed” as a “non-profit organization,”221 
raises an issue about whether the NCJPA misrepresented itself before the CPUC 
and to the public. 
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Table A: Presentation by Tina Simms,  
NCJPA Interim Operations Manager to the CPUC222
 
This Article recommends the CPUC issue an Order to Show Cause to the 
NCJPA and its members to determine whether NCJPA misled the Commission 
and the public about its legal status in violation of CPUC Rules of Practice and 
Procedure 1.1.  That rule requires respect for the CPUC and that those who 
appear before the CPUC never “mislead the Commission or its staff by an 
artifice or false statement of fact or law.”223  A misrepresentation or artifice to 
deceive the CPUC would violate CPUC Rule 1.1.  The CPUC should take 
appropriate steps to protect the integrity of the Commission’s proceedings and 
respect for its rule, orders, decisions, and resolutions. 
Simms’ characterization of the NCJPA as “formedto [sic] be formed” as a 
“non-profit organization” when it has not applied for or obtained non-profit 
status appears to be more than a typo in light of the 1998 Agreement’s statement 
that NCJPA will be formed as a non-profit.224  NCJPA may have also 
represented itself to the City and County of San Francisco as a non-profit, as 
evidenced by San Francisco’s ordinance adopting the 1998 Agreement upon 
NCJPA’s insistence that doing so was necessary to maintain membership.225 
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Representing NCJPA as “formedto [sic] be formed as a non-profit” has 
competitive significance.  Asserted non-profit status may induce public or 
private entities to join NCJPA since non-profits have reporting and 
accountability mechanisms and do not pay taxes.  Municipalities may be 
attracted to NCJPA because of the revenues that can be produced by attachers 
and deals NCJPA may facilitate.  Desire for a municipal revenue source does 
not entitle public entities to erect barriers to competition that violate state and 
federal antitrust and unfair competition laws, and CPUC rules and policies to 
promote competitive utility pole access. 
JPC public and private sector members should examine the JPCs’ lack of non-
profit status and the organizations representations about their non-profit status.  
Representations about NCJPA’s planned or actual non-profit status may have 
been intended to deter more robust oversight of NCJPA and to attract 
government and utility members. 
Persuading pole owners including municipalities and POUs to join NCJPA 
puts utility poles, including those owned by municipal and irrigation district 
members, under NCJPA rules including its incumbent member veto rules.  
Google was able to gain access to poles in Palo Alto in 2016 when it planned to 
deploy Google Fiber because the Palo Alto municipal utility district was not a 
NCJPA member.226  In areas where utility poles are put under NCJPA or SCJPC 
control, prospective utility pole attachers or owners face the gauntlet of JPC 
membership requirements and rules.  JPC members who are competitors in the 
utility pole access market could delay or block access to IOU or publicly owned 
poles by not attending meetings to consider new members or voting to deny 
membership. 
Several JPC members characterized the organization as producing benefits 
such as cost and information sharing and coordinating pole access and 
maintenance work.227  Yet, NCJPA membership by municipalities such as the 
City and County of San Francisco puts its infrastructure under the veto power of 
other NCJPA members and subjects pole access to NCJPA rules that have not 
been publicly vetted. 
JPC rules to access membership benefits remain opaque, without government 
supervision, and without immunity to utility, unfair competition, or antitrust 
regulation.  The risks to safety and competition JPCs create merits further 
analysis under antitrust law and unfair competition law, and CPUC review of 
inconsistency between JPCs rules and function and CPUC safety and 
competition decisions.  The City of San Francisco offered to buy PG&E’s 
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electric infrastructure assets in the city to increase local control over utility 
operations, a proposition PG&E rejected.228  As San Francisco and other areas 
served by PG&E evaluate their options following PG&E’s emergence from 
bankruptcy in summer 2020, they should examine the role of the NCJPA in 
safety and competitive access. 
This Article recommends that the California Attorney General’s Office 
examine the NCJPA’s representation to the public, the CPUC, prospective and 
current members about their non-profit status.  Representing itself as a non-profit 
“formedto [sic] be formed” as NCJPA did at the CPUC’s March 2017 
workshop229 provides false comfort to public entities and the public that NCJPA 
operates in a neutral and accountable manner.  Those representations may have 
induced municipalities and utilities to join NCJPA and put more poles under 
NCJPA’s control, rules, and opaque procedures. 
The California AG’s Office should determine if NCJPA’s representations 
about its alleged impending non-profit status over the past twenty-three years 
constitutes an unfair, deceptive, or fraudulent practice under California Business 
and Professions (“B&P”) Code § 17200.230  NCJPA representations about its 
non-profit status despite the lack of any such filing and its rules should also be 
examined under the Cartwright Act Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16700, which 
prohibits unfair competition. 
V.  THE ROLE OF UTILITY POLE ASSOCIATIONS 
They will outlast the elms.231 
- John Updike, “Telephone Poles” 
A.  JPC Roles, Function, and Competitive Significance 
As part of the CPUC investigation and rulemaking initiated in June 2017 to 
determine whether to order a utility pole census to protect safety and 
competition,  the CPUC has been examining the function of  JPCs.232  In January 
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2019, CPUC ALJ Mason issued a ruling requesting comment on JPC functions 
and their role as a clearinghouse for utility pole records.233  Analysis of JPC roles 
and risks is important to assessment of JPCs’ competitive significance and effect 
on safety and reliability. 
JPCs put themselves at the heart of utility pole access, maintenance, and 
information markets.  The California Appellate Court for the Sixth District noted 
in 2018 that “the Northern California Joint Pole Association controlled access to 
the utility poles, and access was available only if all of those using the pole 
agreed and the pole would not be overloaded by additional equipment.”234 
JPC members described the organizations as an “administrator of records 
involving the sale and purchase of equity interest, and shared maintenance costs, 
in jointly owned poles.”235  As NCJPA’s website states, “[m]embers of the 
Association make a voluntary joint undertaking to share expenses regarding 
ownership, maintenance, use, setting, replacement, dismantling, relinquishment 
or removal of jointly owned poles.”236  NCJPA explains that its function “is to 
calculate the values of each transaction based on each year’s authorized costs 
agreed upon by all members.”237 
PG&E’s characterization of the NCJPA’s role cited the Association’s cost-
sharing function described in the 1998 NCJPA agreement.238  Yet, PGE admitted 
in September 2019 that it had written off $3.5 million debts attributable to 
NCJPA member AT&T for joint ownership vegetation management and other 
expenses due to non-payment, though AT&T had agreed via emails to reimburse 
those costs.239  PG&E’s testimony about its $3.5 million write-off of vegetation 
management costs it attributed to AT&T calls into question the effectiveness of 
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NCJPA as a cost-sharing facilitator and highlights the need for CPUC 
enforcement of vegetation management responsibilities for all joint pole owners 
and attachers.  
As a member of both the SCJPC and the NCJPA, AT&T informed the CPUC 
that “AT&T’s understanding is that neither Association currently acts as a 
clearinghouse for pole location, ownership, attachment, or access 
information.”240  AT&T characterized the JPCs’ principle function as providing 
“a framework for the calculation and sharing of costs and expenses relating to 
the sale and purchase of joint pole equity interests.  In other words, the 
Associations administer joint pole ownership and billing between and among 
members.”241 
PG&E, as well as NCJPA Interim Operations Manager Simms, described 
NCJPA as  a “voluntary joint undertaking to share expenses regarding the 
ownership, maintenance, use, setting, replacement, dismantling, abandonment 
or removal of jointly owned poles.”242  “As such,” PG&E explained, “the 
NCJPA retains records of transactions, pole space, and grade owned by its 
members, but any pole location, attachment, or access information in the 
NCJPA’s records would be quite limited.  Thus, PG&E would not characterize 
the NCJPA as a ‘clearinghouse’ for such information.”243  CMUA asserted “the 
JPAs [Joint Pole Associations] do not obtain, maintain, or provide access to pole 
data.  Rather, such data and access to this data lies with the individual utilities 
that have the data.”244 
CMUA further explained that “SCJPC and NCJPA simply administer records 
involving the sale and purchase of equity interest in jointly owned poles, and 
establish guidelines for pole values and the sharing among owners of authorized 
costs.”245  Moreover, “[t]hese guidelines may include agreement on how, what, 
and when joint owners may communicate about pole related activity.”  246 
Describing the NCJPA and SCJPC role in the sale of pole space, CMUA stated 
that “JPAs do not get involved in decisions related to, or the process of, selling 
or buying space on poles; JPAs only get involved at the end of transactions at 
the point when money is exchanged between parties.”247  NCJPA and SCJPC 
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possess “only that data as is provided by the pole owners necessary for it to 
exercise its financial function.”248 
SCE argued that the SCJPC “should continue in its current role as an 
administrator of records involving the sale and purchase of equity interest in 
jointly owned poles and also the agreed upon shared cost of maintenance of 
jointly owned poles among its members.”249  SCE “relies on SCJPC records for 
pole locations, ownership and equity interest information, and the processing of 
financial transactions.”250  SCE argued “[a]ccess information” about poles “is 
correctly limited to SCJPC members.”251 
At the CPUC’s November 2018 Pole OII Workshop, SCE’s representative 
described SCJPC as “essentially just [an] escrow company[y]” that uses paper 
records to record utility pole transactions.252  SCE explained that this 
“information isn’t easily upload[ed]” as it is recorded in the pole association’s 
offices so that “we do not have unique information as to every single type of 
attachment whether it was just steel strand, whether it’s fiber optic cable, steel 
strand with fiber or steel strand with conductive cable, coax or what have 
you.”253 
The California Cable and Telecommunications Association (CCTA) stated 
that “cable companies typically are not pole owners, and while a cable company 
may join the NCJPA to gain access to mapping and related access information, 
cable companies generally do not own shares of poles.”254  CCTA reported that 
cable companies “typically have entered into pole attachment agreements” with 
ILEC “NCJPA members pursuant to Pub. Util. Code § 767.5 and the 
Commission’s Rights-Of -Way Decision (D.98-10-058).”255 
CLEC ExteNet “places its equipment on jointly owned utility poles through 
membership in the Northern and Southern Joint Pole Associations, and through 
bi-lateral pole attachment agreements with electric utilities.”256  ExteNet 
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“occasionally places its own poles in the public rights-of-way when there are no 
existing utility poles, or existing poles are fully loaded and cannot be replaced 
or modified to accommodate additional equipment.”257 
The City and County of San Francisco in 2017-2018 analyzed potential 
deployment of an Internet fiber backbone to support local gigabit speed 
services.258  Parties wishing to attach to utility poles “may become joint owners 
or tenants, if the pole owners agree to make space accessible, and allow the party 
to purchase an interest in a pole through the [NCJPA],”259 San Francisco’s 
Budget and Legislative Analyst’s Office noted.  That memo observes that many 
“utility poles in California are subject to joint ownership arrangements; the 
NCJPA has 40 members, including the City and County of San Francisco.”260  
San Francisco reported that “[b]esides handling billing issues, the NCJPA has 
established procedures and protocols for aspects of joint pole ownership not 
addressed by GO 95, such as joint pole planning practice, pole replacement and 
removal, identification of poles and attachments for record-keeping 
purposes.”261 
CMUA argues that SCJPC and NCJPA “serve the interests of their members 
and were not established to serve as information clearinghouses for non-
members who desire access to poles or information about poles.”262  CMUA 
urged that the CPUC “must acknowledge that JPAs are governed by their 
members, and any obligation accepted by a JPA must be voted on by its 
members.  Therefore, the Commission could not unilaterally decide to alter the 
roles and functions of SCJPC or NCJPA.”263  CMUA characterized NCJPA and 
SCJPC as “valuable industry organizations that provide essential services that 
reduce costs and administrative burdens for their members.”264 
CMUA described JPCs as “voluntary associations comprised of publicly 
owned utilities (“POUs”), investor owned utilities (“IOUs”), telephone 
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companies, wireless companies, and cable providers.”265  As CMUA clarified, 
“some of these entities are regulated by the [California Public Utilities] 
Commission, and some of them are not.”266  CMUA argues the CPUC “does not 
have broad generalized authority beyond public utilities, and JPAs, such as 
NCJPA and SCJPC, are not public utilities,” and contends that “regulating these 
voluntary organizations is outside the scope of the Commission’s authority.”267  
CPUC ALJ Miles observed that “NCJPA is comprised of municipalities, 
irrigation districts, electric utilities, telephone companies, wireless companies 
and cable providers, some of which are entities regulated by the Commission, 
and some of which are nonregulated entities.”268 
CMUA argues that the CPUC “should not attempt to alter the roles of these 
longstanding organizations.  Imposing any amount of Commission regulation 
over these organization[s] could threaten the very existence of the JPAs and the 
vast number of associated agreements between its members.”269  Further, 
CMUA argued, “any attempt by the Commission to regulate NCJPA or SCJPC 
would set a troubling precedent, potentially exposing any trade or industry group 
that involves a public utility to direct regulation by the Commission.”270 
NCJPA Interim Operations Manager Simms explained at a CPUC 2017 
workshop that each “member has or desires to hold joint equity in utility poles 
in and around Northern California.”271  NCJPA describes its mission as 
providing “accurate and timely pricing for all joint pole transactions while 
providing ongoing support, ensuring a seamless experience for all joint pole 
member companies.”272  NCJPA calculates “the values of each transaction based 
on each year’s authorized costs agreed upon by all members.  At the end of each 
month, the Association prepares monthly Bills of Sales (Form 44) by which each 
member can then make their monetary settlement.”273  To do so, NCJPA 
maintains “records, for the work connected with recording and pricing of 
transactions for the joint use of poles and their appurtenances” and prepared 
“Assessments, Bills of Sale (Form 44) to members, and related joint use 
activities.”274 
NCJPA performs “the pricing and billing of physical construction work as 
directed by the constructing utility and in accordance with the Routine 
Handbook.”275  The Association also reacts to “[j]oint Pole billing information 
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provided by member(s) on Routine Handbook Forms 2, 7, 44, 48–submission of 
one of these Forms triggers an NCJPA pricing or billing update to the Friend 
database” which contains information about pole locations, ownership, and 
features.276 
NCJPA effectively acts as a private standard setting organization (SSO) 
outside of the purview of CPUC rulemaking or review.  Simms reported to the 
CPUC that through its committees NCJPA adopts standards designed to promote 
utility pole safety and reliability.277    This private standards-setting role 
increases the JPCs’ competitive significance. 
The Supreme Court recognized in Allied Tube v. Indian Head, Inc., that 
standards adopted through an association’s process that undermine competition 
can disadvantage competitors, erect barriers to competition and service, and add 
costs.278  Utility pole attachment, maintenance, and other standards adopted 
outside of the CPUC’s purview pose risks to public safety and reliability and 
erect competitive barriers. 
Lack of CPUC review of JPC rules and standards highlights the safety gap 
created by JPC private standard-setting.  Electric and communications wires, 
antennas, transformers, and other assets that may pose safety risks and are 
necessary to competitive service, attach to utility poles JPCs have made subject 
to their rules.  Fire and utility infrastructure safety, reliability, and competition 
risks demand rigorous analysis of JPC rules, roles, risks, function, and conduct. 
B.  The Competitive Significance of the JPCs Function, Structure, and 
Membership Rules to Competition, Safety, and Reliability 
Comments submitted to the CPUC about JPCs’ function, CPUC workshops, 
the NCJPA Agreement, and other public documents indicate that JPCs perform 
five main competitive and safety functions.  JPCs facilitate: 1) utility pole space 
sales by providing members with cost calculation and information; 2) sharing of 
“expenses regarding the ownership, maintenance, use, setting, replacement, 
dismantling, abandonment or removal of jointly owned poles”279; 3) sharing 
utility pole information including “mapping and related access information”280 
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about “pole locations, ownership and equity interest information;”281 4) 
calculating and sharing information about maintenance or compliance costs,282 
and; 5) establishing standards through procedures members observe for the 
conduct of pole work as described in the unpublished “Agreement and 
Operations Handbook” and other documents.283 
JPCs limit information exchange, cost sharing, standard-setting development 
and access to JPC members.  Neither prospective members who compete with 
JPC members for pole space and to offer a range of services, nor regulators have 
had ready access to information JPCs gather and guard. 
JPC development of utility pole and attachment procedures and standards 
outside of the CPUC’s review raises safety risks.  The CPUC’s 2013 approval 
of the settlement regarding the Malibu Canyon Fire stated that reliance on 
SCJPC procedures does not create a defense to violations of GO 95 or other 
CPUC rules.284 
CPUC ALJ Miles’ Arbitrator’s Report on the Crown Castle-PG&E Pole 
ownership access dispute concludes that “although PG&E and Crown Castle 
voluntarily participate in the Northern California Joint Pole Association 
(NCJPA), we [the CPUC] are not required to give deference to the provisions of 
agreements, policies or procedures of that association.”285  CPUC further 
explained that “[t]ransactions concerning the sale or lease of utility property 
(such as the transaction at issue between PG&E and Crown Castle here), are 
already within the Commission’s jurisdiction under Public Utilities Code 
Section (Pub. Util. Code §) 851.286 
NCJPA’s stated purpose, CPUC ALJ Miles notes, “is to share expenses 
regarding the ownership, maintenance, use, setting, replacement, dismantling, 
abandonment or removal of jointly owned poles.”287  CPUC ALJ Miles adds that 
“the NCJPA Agreement and the NCJPA Operations Handbook go beyond 
accounting for expenses and deal with many terms and conditions of joint pole 
transfer and usage.”288  The CPUC’s report on the history of utility poles states 
that the SCJPC Handbook contains procedures and protocols for issues such as: 
“1) Joint pole planning practice; 2) Pole replacement; 3) Transferring, 
rearranging, or changing facilities; 4) Removal, abandonment, or relinquishment 
of a pole; 5) Rights of way; 6) Correcting the record or cancelling a joint pole 
agreement; and 7) Identification of poles and attachments for record-keeping 
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purposes.”289  These standard-setting and record-keeping procedures require 
antitrust and unfair competition analysis, and examination for their consistency 
with CPUC safety, reliability, competition, and other regulations. 
CPUC ALJ Miles recommended that “if NCJPA is going to continue to 
facilitate sale and purchase transactions pertaining to public utility poles among 
its member entities,” the CPUC should “require NCJPA to submit (before 
implementation) for Commission review and approval under Pub. Util. Code § 
851, its agreements, forms, procedures and handbooks which concern the 
transfer, sale, lease, assignment, mortgage, or encumbrance of public utility 
poles.”290  She added that “[s]uch transactions, which are being handled by 
NCJPA on behalf of its members, are clearly within the Commission’s 
jurisdiction.”291 
California Public Utilities (CA PU) Code 313 allows the CPUC plenary access 
to utility records.  The CPUC can order utilities and entities under the 
Commission’s jurisdiction to produce records of correspondence with the JPC 
and their members. 
In addition to safety functions, the information and cost-sharing functions that 
JPCs perform are important to competition.  CCTA reported that although its 
cable company members generally lease rather than buy utility pole space, 
CCTA members join the NCJPA and SCJPC to “gain access to mapping and 
related access information.”292  CMUA’s characterization of the JPCs as 
“valuable industry organizations that provide essential services that reduce costs 
and administrative burdens for their members”293 underscores the competitive 
advantages JPCs give to their members.  JPC information, cost-sharing, and 
technical functions mediate access to competition, cost-competitiveness, and 
utility safety and reliability. 
JPCs’ role in “calculation and sharing of costs and expenses relating to the 
sale and purchase of joint pole equity interests,”294 raises questions about 
whether JPCs erect barriers to competition authorized in the 1998 ROW 
agreement and subsequent CPUC decisions.  Mulqueen’s report for the CPUC’s 
Policy and Planning Division providing an introduction to utility poles states 
that “[p]arties wishing to become joint owners may purchase an interest in a pole 
through the Northern California Joint Pole Association (NCJPA) or the Southern 
California Joint Pole Committee (SCJPC), which track ownership of and activity 
on jointly owned poles and invoice members for their activities.”295  No CPUC 
decision requires prospective pole owners to conduct those transactions through 
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the JPCs.  Mulqueen’s report highlights the JPC practice of serving as an 
intermediary to complete those transactions.296 
JPC membership appears to be open to pole space renters such as members of 
CCTA.  Mulqueen reported that renters authorized to attach facilities to utility 
poles may “lease space from a pole owner without purchasing an interest in the 
pole.  Pole owners perform the necessary pole loading calculations to determine 
whether it is safe for a Renter to attach to a pole; SCE reports that it has 160 
active renters on its poles” as of 2014.297 
Southern California Edison (SCE) stated in 2016 that “California’s electric 
utilities have established processes for other parties to obtain access to poles, 
including joint pole entities.”298  SCE clarified that 70% of Southern California 
Edison (SCE) poles are joint use, which does not equate to jointly owned.299  It 
is not clear whether poles that are not jointly owned, but may interconnect to 
jointly owned poles, are also subject to JPC information and cost-sharing, 
standards, or procedures. 
Based on JPC member descriptions,300 JPC membership is a substantial 
competitive advantage in the utility pole ownership and maintenance market.  
JPC functions such as its standards setting process and administration implicate 
the CPUC’s safety jurisdiction.  JPC functions, rules, and risks require 
immediate review as California works to mitigate climate change, wildfire 
danger, and public safety risks. 
VI.  INFRASTRUCTURE ACCESS, GOOGLE AND THE CPUC FACE THE NCJPA 
SUPERMAJORITY QUORUM AND NEW MEMBER VOTING REQUIREMENTS 
Lift incredulous to their fearsome crowns of bolts, trusses, struts, nuts, 
insulators, and such Barnacles as compose…301 
- John Updike, “Telephone Poles” 
A.  Google and the CPUC Confront JPC Membership Barriers 
Google’s attempts to join the NCJPA in 2014-2016 as part of its efforts to 
provide Google Fiber service in California including in San Jose, California’s 
third largest city and the tenth largest city in America, highlight the competitive 
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barriers erected by the NCJPA’s membership rules.302  CPUC Decision 15-05-
002 determined in 2015 that Google is a franchised Video Service Provider 
(VSP) that transmits television programs by cable to subscribers for a fee and 
thus is a cable television corporation that has a right to access utility 
infrastructure under CA PU Code 767.5 such as utility poles.303 
Google’s Communications Law Director, Austin Schlick, complained to the 
CPUC that the NCJPA’s rules created barriers to building Google Fiber service 
through utility pole access.304  As Schlick stated, “[g]aining access” to utility 
infrastructure “in a timely manner,” “bears on Google Fiber’s decisions whether 
to build new networks, as well as enables it to serve customers more quickly.”305 
The CPUC Communications Division staff reported in September 2016 that 
NCJPA was having trouble convening a quorum of three-quarters of the 
members to vote on Google’s membership application to facilitate its pole access 
and deployment of Google Fiber.306  At the CPUC’s September 29, 2016 
Commission Voting Meeting, I stated that as a Commissioner “who’s also an 
antitrust law professor, I’m really concerned about . . . whether the rules are 
sufficiently pro- competitive. . . .  [W]e want to encourage competition and 
choice, and we expect the pole safety committees to respect and facilitate 
that.”307  I concluded, “I would also urge the [utility pole] committees to also not 
force us to go down the enforcement route.”308  CPUC Commissioner Randolph 
stated at that meeting, 
 If we are going to meet the policy goals of ensuring broadband and 
ensuring competition and customer choice, entities are going to need 
to be able to attach, they’re going to need to be able to attach safely 
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and they’re going to need to be able to attach in an expeditious 
manner.309 
Google announced in October 2016 that it was slowing deployment of Google 
Fiber.310  To date, Google has not constructed fiber service in San Jose, 
California and many other cities where it had envisioned expansion.  Google 
estimated that to deploy fiber for high-speed Internet in San Jose, “60 percent of 
its [fiber] cable would be underground and 40 percent aerial,” the later 
depending on access to utility poles.311  NCJPA membership association rules 
and conduct may have lengthened time to market and erected hurdles to 
competition. 
Google sought to become an NCJPA member and to own utility poles space 
to deploy Google Fiber.312  The CPUC’s Competition OII Decision noted that 
“AT&T in May, 2015 announced that it was discontinuing its practice in 
Northern California of buying space on a pole for third-party attachers when 
AT&T itself did not own sufficient surplus space on that pole to accommodate 
the attacher.”313  Although “AT&T has a 2014 agreement with Google that 
allows the Internet giant to access AT&T poles anywhere in the U.S.,”314 for 
poles not solely owned by AT&T and subject to the NCJPA’s management, 
NCJPA membership was critical for Google’s pole access.  As the East Bay 
Times reported, “[i]n San Jose, where Google and city officials are actively 
planning for citywide fiber rollout, the pole association controls most utility 
poles and only members can access those, according to Michael Liw, the city’s 
deputy director of public works.”315 
PG&E spokesperson Tamar Sarkissian said that while its “agreement with 
Google provides access to PG&E poles, we have discussed with Google it needs 
to contact the communications utility for access to jointly owned poles.”316  
PG&E’s statement indicates that utility pole owners such as PG&E made JPCs 
an intermediary for access to the utility pole ownership, access, and maintenance 
market. 
CPUC Communications Division staff member Robert Wullenjohn reported 
at a Commission voting meeting about the importance of NCJPA membership 
to the pole attachment process and the provision of competitive communications 
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services.317  NCJPA “Association members are able simply to purchase pole 
space for their attachments themselves, rather than going through a much more 
complicated leasing and contract process,” he explained to the Commission 
Voting Meeting.318  Wullenjohn continued, “[m]embership in the [NCJPA] 
would allow companies like Google to bypass difficulties in the leasing process 
that have been impossible to surmount in the three or four months that CD has 
been trying to facilitate the process.”319 
As the East Bay Times reported, “Google’s plan to bring ultrahigh-speed 
Internet service to the Bay Area has run into a decidedly non-tech hurdle: utility 
poles” and in order to “roll out Google Fiber in five Silicon Valley cities, the 
tech giant needs access to the poles for stringing up fiber cable.  But in several 
cities a who’s who of Google competitors are standing in the way.”320  By 
contrast, in Palo Alto, California, “the pole association controls only 5 percent 
of the utility poles.  Some 90 percent are jointly owned by the city and AT&T.  
‘No problems to report,’ city spokesperson Catherine Elvert said, regarding the 
city’s work with the two companies on Google Fiber pole access.”321 
A municipality’s or irrigation district’s decision to join NCJPA or SCJPA 
brings their utility pole assets within the governance of JPC rules.  NCJPA 
governance creates an effective member veto that allows incumbents to block or 
delay access by failing to forum a quorum or approve a new member.  Neither 
do NCJPA rules require any public explanation, or communication of 
information to the proposed member, attacher, or the CPUC, about the reasons 
for failing to forum a quorum or approve a new member’s application. 
JPCs erected these requirements despite the CPUC’s 1998 Row Decision and 
subsequent CPUC decisions to promote competitive access to utility poles for 
attachers.  The CPUC determines who is qualified to attach to utility poles and 
maintains its safety jurisdiction over utility poles, overhead lines, and 
underground facilities.  JPCs intermediate the CPUC’s regulatory function. 
Google Fiber’s February 5, 2016 letter to the CPUC stated “PG&E and the 
Northern California Joint Pole Association were ‘resisting their duty of 
providing nondiscriminatory access’ afforded under D.15-05-002.”322  Google 
alleged that video service providers “like Google Fiber continue to be excluded 
from membership from the Northern California Joint Pole Association if they do 
not possess a certificate of public convenience and necessity (CPCN),”323 
despite the CPUC’s 2015 Decision 15-05-002 authorizing VSPs utility pole 
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access.  Google continued, “because state-franchised VSPs do not need a CPCN 
to deploy infrastructure in the public rights of way or to offer service to 
consumers, this membership requirement lacks any reasonable basis for these 
providers.”324 
Google’s membership application could not be approved under NCJPA’s 
rules without a supermajority quorum to consider and approve a new member 
application.  As Google argued, “[u]tilities should not be able to use their own 
internal policies or joint associations to avoid obligations to provide access to 
infrastructure and thereby delay deployment of competitive broadband 
infrastructure.”325  Google argued that “utilities obligated to provide access 
should not be allowed to avoid those obligations by establishing unreasonably 
slow or cumbersome working arrangements with other utilities that are involved 
in pole-access processes, or by failing to establish arrangements that are needed 
to effectuate third parties’ access rights.”326 
Neither the CPUC nor any statute authorize the JPCs or their members to 
make JPC membership a threshold for utility service offering and competition 
that requires utility pole access.  As an agreement among competitors for utility 
pole access necessary for increasingly convergent and co-dependent 
communications and electric services, the JPCs and their members are subject 
to state and federal antitrust and unfair competition laws. 
B.  CPUC Jurisdiction Over Disposition of Utility Assets 
California law confers on the CPUC authority to determine whether to 
approve the disposition of a utility asset.  California Pub. Util. Code § 851 
requires a CPUC order to approve the sale, lease, assignment, mortgage, or 
encumbrance of utility assets valued at $5 million or more.327  California PU 
Code 851 prohibits disposition of utility assets valued under $5 million unless 
the Commission approves that transaction through the CPUC’s Advice Letter 
process, following staff-level review and recommendation, or, for uncontested 
advice letters, the CPUC’s Executive Director or the appropriate division 
director issues such an approval.328 
No CPUC order has granted the NCJPA or SCJPC or its members exemption 
from the CPUC’s requirements for approval of the disposition of utility assets.  
The 1998 NCJPA agreement describes Appendix A as “Commission 
confirmation that § 851 does not apply,” though no such document is posted in 
the NCJPA agreement available through the City of San Francisco website.329  
No such Commission documentation of an NCJPA § 851 exemption is available 
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in the public record.  Even if a CPUC staff member had issued such a letter in 
1998 or earlier, it would not hold the weight of a Commission order or decision.  
No CPUC order, decision, or resolution relieves regulated utilities of the duty to 
comply with the CPUC’s statutory asset transfer approval process under CA PU 
Code 851. 
The CPUC should issue a data request to the utilities it regulates who are 
NCJPA and SCJPC members to ask if they have transferred assets through the 
JPC without first obtaining CPUC approval.  Records kept by JPC members and 
JPCs can facilitate analysis of whether utility assets have been disposed of 
through JPCs without CPUC approval.  California law grants the CPUC with 
authority to ask for and inspect utility records and facilities under Cal. Pub. Util. 
Code § 313 and § 314(a).330 
Failure to comply with CA PU Code § 851 should be identified and the CPUC 
should determine whether any penalty or remedy is appropriate if CPUC 
authorization was not obtained prior to transfer.  The JPC’s role in the utility 
asset sale process underscores the need for CPUC analysis of whether JPCs and 
their members operate in accordance with CPUC rules and California law. 
VII.  NETWORK EFFECTS OF UTILITY POLE JOINT MANAGEMENT AND 
REGULATION OF COMPETITIVE ACCESS AND SAFETY 
These weathered encrustations of electrical debris331 
- John Updike, “Telephone Poles” 
Communications and electricity are classic network industries that become 
more valuable as more people connect and additional facilities are built to 
support a range of services.  Statutes adopted to promote expansion of telegraph 
and telephone networks reflect universal service objectives “founded on the 
concept that all subscribers to a telephone company’s basic service network 
benefit when another person joins that network.  Therefore, the entire network 
is more valuable because of the addition of the new subscriber.”332 
Regardless of the device through which we connect to communications, 
video, or electric services, the infrastructure supporting those services is 
composed of a vast, interconnected network of utility poles, wires, conduit, and 
other physical facilities.  Utility poles form the scaffold that supports the wires, 
antenna, power sources, and means of power distribution and transmission 
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services.  This platform enables communications, cable, Internet and electric 
services that power our modern economy, democracy, and way of life.333 
Utility pole associations share many characteristics of a network joint venture, 
but NCJPA’s 1998 agreement section 21 states that it is not a joint venture or 
partnership.334  Utility pole joint use with CPUC authorization and oversight, 
could reduce costs, increase competition and service deployment, and promote 
safety and reliability.  For these reasons, the California legislature adopted laws 
in 1915, updated in 1951, allowing the CPUC to order joint use of utility poles 
with appropriate compensation.335  Sharing costs of accessing and maintaining 
utility poles reduces capital and operations costs, burdens on communities from 
multiple poles, and enables the provision of a variety of consumer services at 
lower costs than if the network had to be duplicated.336 
State policy to promote joint pole use reduces burdens on rights-of-way that 
cross communities, towns, rural areas, and forests by limiting the need to build 
additional infrastructure.  A utility pole access and management process that 
favors incumbents and thwarts regulatory supervision undermines competition, 
innovation, public service, and safety. 
The CPUC, not the pole association, determines the legal right to access poles 
and the standards for utility infrastructure maintenance.337  CPUC rules curb the 
trader, or utility pole owner’s freedom to choose with whom to deal.  The 
Supreme Court under United States v. Colgate & Co., recognized that absent an 
anticompetitive purpose, federal antitrust law does not limit a trader’s freedom 
to choose with whom to deal.338  CPUC rules delineate the type of entity, 
licensee, or authorization holder who has a legal right to utility pole access.339  
CPUC Decision 98-10-058 requires pole owners to deal with competitors who 
wish to buy or lease pole space (subject to certain technical and safety limitations 
and CPUC decisions about who can attach).340  The CPUC’s decisions eliminate 
a potential antitrust defense running from Colgate through Trinko to Linkline 
that limits the duty of competitors to deal with rivals.341 
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Brett Frischmann and Spencer Weber Waller note that the Supreme Court’s 
Verizon v. Trinko 2004 opinion states that “essential facility claims should be 
denied where a state or federal agency has effective power to compel sharing 
and to regulate its scope and terms.”342   They argue that a “viable essential 
facilities doctrine of necessity exists in the vast economic canyon between fully 
competitive markets and fully regulated ones.  Fully regulated markets come 
with extensive regulatory oversight and accompanying antitrust immunities.”343 
The CPUC’s lack of direct regulation of JPCs indicates that the market is not 
so comprehensively regulated as to confer antitrust immunities under Trinko.344  
Neither does the CPUC actively supervise utility pole associations and adopt a 
policy of displacing competition as required under Phoebe Putney to confer 
antitrust immunity.345  The CPUC has a policy to promote competition, not to 
displace it. 
Trinko is a Sherman Act Section 2 case alleging that the telephone company 
defendant abused or attempted to abuse monopoly power.346  For JPCs, 
supermajority voting rules for prospective new members, their agreements about 
information and cost sharing, their standard setting with no oversight, and other 
aspects of their function raise concerns about harms to competition from 
competitors’ concerted action.  This Article urges antitrust and unfair 
competition law analysis of California JPC rules and roles to examine potential 
Sherman Act Section 1 violations involving agreements between competitors 
that harm competition. 
Analysis of the JPCs’ potential pro- and anticompetitive benefits and harms 
under antitrust and unfair competition law is beyond this article’s scope.  Such 
an analysis should examine any benefits in the context of the NCJPA agreement 
which says it is not a joint venture, distinguishing it from other cases that argued 
the joint venture’s benefits merited rule-of-reason standard of review.347  
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Comments submitted to the CPUC indicate that JPCs create non-price barriers 
to competition that may raise rivals’ costs,348 and affect utility service 
affordability. 
NCJPA rules allow incumbents to raise rivals’ costs through delayed voting, 
not voting, or a no vote, even when the rival is authorized by the CPUC to have 
access to utility poles.349  This process tends to decrease output, reducing the 
supply and range of services offered competitors offer.  Such concerted action 
decreases and delays competition, contrary to the State of California’s policy to 
promote competition in the communications field.  NCJPA’s membership rules 
erect hurdles that give incumbents effective veto power over new members. 
Antitrust law has long condemned this type of concerted agreement, leading 
the organizations in Associated Press350 and Realty Multi-List to drop several 
provisions in their agreements before their antitrust trials began.351  The CPUC 
and competition authorities should not allow JPCs and their members to raise 
rivals’ costs, deter competition, or create and maintain safety and reliability 
risks.  Antitrust law, unfair competition law, and public utility law should not 
countenance barriers to competition unduly erected through agreements between 
incumbent competitors. 
VIII.  STATE ACTION ANTITRUST EXEMPTION DOES NOT APPLY TO NCJPA 
SUPERMAJORITY VOTING REQUIREMENTS 
True, their thin shade is negligible, 
But then again there is not that tragic autumnal 
Casting-off of leaves to outface annually.352 
- John Updike, “Telephone Poles” 
A.  The Legal Standard for the State Action Immunity Doctrine 
Immunity from federal antitrust liability under the State Action Doctrine 
requires both a state policy to displace competition and active supervision by the 
state.  The state must articulate a purpose for its program that supplants 
competition, intent to displace competition, and actively supervise the 
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program.353  When it applies, “[t]he doctrine of state action immunity exempts 
some state policies, legislation, and regulatory programs from federal antitrust 
liability on federalism and state sovereignty grounds.”354 
The Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in North Carolina State Bd. of Dental 
Examiners v. F.T.C. recognizes that since the Court’s 1943 Parker v. 
Brown355 decision, federal antitrust laws have been interpreted “to confer 
immunity on anticompetitive conduct by the States when acting in their 
sovereign capacity.”356  The Supreme Court in Parker v. Brown noted, “[w]e 
find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests 
that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities 
directed by its legislature.”357 
The Court “has repeatedly held that the grant of power to Congress by the 
Commerce Clause did not wholly withdraw from the states the authority to 
regulate the commerce with respect to matters of local concern, on which 
Congress has not spoken.”358  Congress’ purpose to respect the federal balance 
and to “embody in the Sherman Act the federalism principle that the States 
possess a significant measure of sovereignty under our Constitution”359 
underlays the state action immunity doctrine from federal antitrust law.  To 
qualify for state action immunity, “the challenged restraint must be ‘one clearly 
articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy’” and “the policy must be 
‘actively supervised’ by the State itself.”360  The Court has declined to find state-
action immunity where the state did not have a “clearly articulated and 
affirmatively expressed” state policy “designed to displace unfettered business 
freedom . . . .”361 
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In 2013, the Court in F.T.C. v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc. found that 
the anticompetitive effect must have been the “‘foreseeable result’ of what the 
State authorized.”362  In evaluating the actions of a Hospital Authority 
established by a state, the Court in Phoebe Putney determined that the “state-
action immunity defense fails under the clear-articulation test because there is 
no evidence the State affirmatively contemplated that hospital authorities would 
displace competition by consolidating hospital ownership.” 363  As the Court 
explained, “[m]ore is required to establish state-action immunity; the Authority 
must show that it has been delegated authority not just to act, but to act or 
regulate anticompetitively.”364 
Active state supervision that confers federal antitrust immunity must include 
state authority to approve or disapprove private participants’ actions.365  The 
Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Examiners 
v. F.T.C. emphasized that an “entity may not invoke Parker immunity unless the 
actions in question are an exercise of the State’s sovereign power.”366  The 
Sherman Act “confers immunity on the States’ own anticompetitive policies out 
of respect for federalism,” but, the Court emphasized “it does not always confer 
immunity where, as here, a State delegates control over a market to a non-
sovereign actor.”367  As the Court explained, “[f]or purposes of Parker, a non-
sovereign actor is one whose conduct does not automatically qualify as that of 
the sovereign State itself.”368 
The Court clarified that “[s]tate agencies are not simply by their governmental 
character sovereign actors for purposes of state-action immunity.”369  Moreover, 
“[i]mmunity for state agencies,” the Supreme Court emphasized in 2015 
“requires more than a mere facade of state involvement, for it is necessary in 
light of Parker ’s rationale to ensure the States accept political accountability for 
anticompetitive conduct they permit and control.”370 
A program “does not meet the second requirement for Parker immunity” 
where, as in Midcal, the “State simply authorizes price setting and enforces the 
prices established by private parties.”371  The Court emphasized that the 
“national policy in favor of competition cannot be thwarted by casting such a 
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gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is essentially a private price-fixing 
arrangement.”372 
As the Supreme Court has stressed, “[t]he mere presence of some state 
involvement or monitoring does not suffice . . . The active supervision prong of 
the Midcal test requires that state officials have and exercise power to review 
particular anticompetitive acts of private parties and disapprove those that fail to 
accord with state policy.”373  The mere potential for state supervision is not an 
adequate substitute for a decision by the State.374 
B.  No State Action Immunity for the NCJPA’s Supermajority Voting 
Requirements 
The State of California’s policies to promote access to utility poles and lack 
of active supervision of the JPCs indicate that neither the JPCs nor their 
members, public or private, enjoy state action immunities to federal antitrust 
laws. NCJPA’s Supermajority Voting Requirements and rules that contradict 
CPUC policies find no antitrust shield under the State Action doctrine.375  
California state policy is to promote competition for communications services 
through access to utility poles, not to displace it. 
Following passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the CPUC 
adopted several decisions to promote communications competition including 
through utility pole access.376  To promote competition, the CPUC’s 1998 ROW 
decision, 98-10-058, expanded and defined the categories of communications 
providers who could attach to utility poles.377 
CPUC Decision 16-01-046 adopted rules promoting non-discriminatory 
utility pole access for Commercial Mobile Radio Service (CMRS) providers by 
allowing pole owners to charge the same fee for attachment as charged to CLECs 
and cable television corporations.378  That decision contained the same language 
as the CPUC’s 2007 GO 95 update requiring memorialization of the agreements 
approved in the order “in separate, private agreements with affected utilities, 
companies or municipalities or in the Northern California Joint Pole 
Association’s Operating Routine.”379  The CPUC’s reference to the NCJPA’s 
agreement as “private”380 underscores that the CPUC does not actively supervise 
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the NCJPA.  State policies to promote utility pole competitive access 
demonstrate that JPCs do not meet the first prong of the Phoebe Putney test for 
state action federal antitrust immunity. 
“The active supervision prong of the Midcal test requires that state officials 
have and exercise power to review particular anticompetitive acts of private 
parties and disapprove those that fail to accord with state policy.” 381  The State 
of California does not actively supervise JPCs.  The NCJPA and SCJPCs do not 
report to the CPUC.  JPC decisions are not subject to CPUC review. 
The CPUC has invited NCJPA to send representatives to CPUC workshops, 
and CPUC staff members have discussed concerns with NCJPA staff and 
members.382  These workshop invitations and informal staff discussions are 
insufficient to constitute active state supervision of JPCs. Lacking active state 
supervision, the second prong of the Phoebe Putney test383 is not met. 
Nor are JPCs state agencies.  Although several CPUC decisions recognized 
that the NCJPA and SCJPC adopt procedures and standards in the handbooks 
they developed outside of the CPUC’s purview, the CPUC description of these 
“private” agreements underscore the lack of state sanction.384 
While some municipalities are members of California JPCs, municipalities are 
subdivisions of the state, not state sovereigns entitled to antitrust immunity under 
the U.S.  federalist system of government.385  Neither are municipally-owned 
utilities or irrigation districts state sovereigns under the U.S federalist 
structure.386 
Failing both prongs of F.T.C. v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc.,387 state 
action immunity is not available to JPCs or their members.  JPC functions, 
including their standard-setting outside of CPUC supervision, their membership 
rules, cost and information sharing, and maintenance processes and standards 
raise competition, safety, reliability, affordability, and other concerns.  JPCs 
have no immunities from federal or state antitrust or unfair competition scrutiny.  
State and federal antitrust and unfair competition scrutiny of JPCs is merited to 
protect competition. 
This Article urges the CPUC to promptly examine JPC rules and functions, 
and take steps to protect safety, reliability, competition, affordability, and to help 
achieve state environmental goals.  Such an examination would not, however, 
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be sufficient to confer antitrust immunity on JPCs as they are neither state 
instrumentalities, nor supervised by the state.  Utility pole associations remain 
subject to federal antitrust and unfair competition laws, state competition laws 
such as the Cartwright Act, and California B&P Code § 17200.388 
IX.  RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Yet they are ours. We made them. 
- John Updike, “Telephone Poles” 
Proper utility pole and infrastructure management can reduce devastating 
wildfires, prevent loss of life, reduce property damage and destruction, and 
forestall wildfire carbon emissions.389  Achieving climate change solutions 
increasingly depends on electric and communications services, many of which 
are attached to utility poles.  Like layers of bark that make a tree into a strong 
utility pole, safety, reliability, competition, and service are intertwined values 
manifested in infrastructure and ROW regulation.  Improving utility pole and 
ROW governance increases safety, enhances reliability and competition, and 
speeds deployment of innovative energy and communications services that 
support climate change solutions. 
The CPUC owes no deference to JPCs, their rules, or the functions JPCs have 
assumed.  Climate change and the acceleration of utility-caused fires demand 
more enforcement of utility pole violations.  Searching analysis of JPCs’ role in 
pole access and maintenance must be part of that safety and reliability 
examination.  The CPUC, antitrust and unfair competition authorities, must 
concurrently examine JPCs’ role in erecting barriers to competition and raising 
rivals’ costs. 
This Article offers a five-point framework for utility pole, conduit, row (PCR) 
access regulation in California.  These principles may also serve as a model for 
other states and jurisdictions: 
1. Protect Safety First! 
 Promptly address hazards and CPUC rule violations on PCR before 
they fuel safety or reliability problems. 
 Do not allow incumbents to undermine safety and reliability, or delay 
or thwart competition by violating CPUC pole and PCR rules, e.g., 
not moving facilities to new poles within 60 days. 
                                                 
 388. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16700 (commonly known as the Cartwright Act); Sandoval, 
Contested Places, Utility Pole Spaces, supra note 55. 
 389. See Associated Press, California Wildfires’ Carbon Emissions Equal a Year of Power 
Pollution, NBC NEWS (Dec. 2, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/california-
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 Do not allow incumbents to engage in private, unsupervised 
standard-setting.  Standards for PCR work must be decided in an open 
process administered by the CPUC. 
2. Foster competition for utility PCR access for those authorized by the 
CPUC to attach 
 Enforce CPUC, antitrust, and unfair competition laws to protect 
competition. Do not allow incumbents to veto competitors or raise 
barriers to access through concerted agreements. 
3. Develop situational awareness about PCR to protect safety and 
reliability and promote competition 
 Map PCR including attachments, owners, lessors, location, and other 
data through a comprehensive database accessible to the CPUC, 
authorized attachers, and pole owners. 
4. Administer PCR access and maintenance through a neutral, 3rd 
party non-profit overseen by the CPUC, not incumbents 
5. Robust, prompt, and well-equipped enforcement and inspection 
protects safety, reliability, and competition 
 Give the CPUC enforcement mechanisms including personnel, 
communications, and information tools necessary for PCR analysis, 
inspection, and enforcement. 
These principles put safety at the forefront of utility pole and ROW 
regulation.390 
At the CPUC’s April 2019 workshop examining PG&E’s Governance, 
Management, and Safety Culture, I observed that some utilities and regulated 
entities have attempted to evade regulatory oversight or rules by characterizing 
a practice as not a safety issue.391  I cited examples where utility pole owners 
classified leaning poles as not a safety issue, and failed to take action on or report 
hazards caused by other utility pole owners or attachers.392  Instead, pole owners 
and attachers should lean toward classifying CPUC utility pole rule violations 
as safety issues and promptly repair hazards.  JPC private standard-setting, lack 
of CPUC oversight of JPCs, and delayed compliance with safety rules such as 
GO 95 create unacceptable safety risks. 
The CPUC must promptly address joint pole owner and attacher attempts to 
evade regulatory responsibility for complying with utility pole safety rules.  
Through swift enforcement action the CPUC must end the practice of shifting 
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millions from joint pole owners to electric ratepayers or shareholders by not 
paying bills such as $3.5 million for joint pole vegetation management costs.393 
The CPUC should examine whether a different system for utility pole 
governance, access, and maintenance would better serve the state’s safety, 
competition, and service goals.  The CPUC should consider whether an 
independent non-profit administrator, instead of a membership association of 
incumbent pole owners and some pole attachers, would better facilitate pole 
access and administration of pole transactions consistent with CA PU Code 851.  
A pole database, like a multiple listing service for pole attachment and space 
availability, if properly and neutrally managed and secured, can facilitate safety, 
competition, and reliability. 
The CPUC should examine whether JPC rules and roles are inconsistent with 
the CPUC’s competitive access policies, and act to remove undue barriers to 
competition erected by agreements between regulated entities and JPC members.  
Supermajority voting requirements allow incumbents to raise rivals’ costs and 
delay competition by not attending the voting meeting so no quorum is formed 
to consider a prospective member’s application.  JPC rules permit tactics that 
protect incumbents, harm competition, and limit consumer choice. 
The NCJPA proffered no justification for its restrictive membership process 
and supermajority quorum and voting rules.  The CPUC determines who is 
eligible to attach to utility poles, not a private association of incumbent attachers.  
NCJPA’s supermajority quorum and voting requirements limit access to 
competitor information and cost sharing benefits, technical routines and 
procedures.  These rules and JPC functions appear to unduly delay competition, 
raise rivals’ costs, and reduce competition’s benefits to consumers. 
The CPUC determines which entities are eligible to access utility poles and 
thus limits the freedom of the trader (the utility pole owner) to choose with 
whom to deal.  JPC supermajority voting requirements effectively act as an 
improper refusal to deal by utilities who have a regulatory duty to grant access 
to competitors qualified to attach by CPUC decisions.  Competitors are not 
entitled to erect barriers to utility pole attachment through industry association 
agreements and concerted action. 
NCJPA would be well-advised to drop supermajority quorum and 
membership rules.   State and federal antitrust authorities should examine 
NCJPA’s supermajority quorum and voting requirements as potential violations 
of the Sherman Act or state unfair competition law. 
The CPUC should promptly examine the anticompetitive effect of JPC rules 
and roles in its utility pole census and competition OII and OIR.  The CPUC 
should use its jurisdiction over utility records under CA PU Code 313 to obtain 
information about JPC agreements, rules, and procedures.  The CPUC should 
issue an order to investor-owned utility members of JPCs to ensure that JPCs do 
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not impede competitive access the CPUC authorizes or the CPUC’s safety rules, 
standards, and procedures.  
NCJPA has failed to file as a non-profit, despite representing that it would do 
so for more than twenty-three years.  The lack of non-profit status for either JPC 
keeps their activities behind a veil of unpublished rules and procedures, 
contributing to lack of transparency or oversight.  The CPUC should issue an 
Order to Show Cause to examine whether the NCJPA violated rule 1.1 by 
representing to the CPUC that it is “formedto [sic] be formed”394 as a non-profit.  
Representing the NCJPA as a non-profit may have deterred more rigorous 
government oversight into their operations.  Those representations may have 
induced POUs and IOUs to join and put their poles under JPC rules.  These 
representations have competitive consequences. 
The California AG should examine whether representations about JPCs’ non-
profit status are false or misleading or constitute unfair competition under 
California B&P Code § 17200.395  The California AG’s office should also 
examine NCJPA and SCJPC state tax liability, filing requirements, any asserted 
exemptions, and the lack of any filings for non-profit or other corporate status. 
The CPUC has the authority and duty to examine whether regulated entities 
are circumventing the CPUC’s asset transfer approval process CA PU Code § 
851 requires through JPC-facilitated transactions.396  Utility poles are a regulated 
asset whose disposition affects the public interest.  The CPUC must ensure that 
regulated utilities are not selling or disposing of utility assets through JPCs 
without complying with California statute and CPUC rules. 
“They blend along small-town streets, Like a race of giants that have faded 
into mere mythology,” John Updike observed in his poem Telephone Poles.397  
These humble poles, first used more than 176 years ago for telegraph lines,398 
remain the backbone of modern communications and electric systems.  Utility 
poles are so ubiquitous that we often fail to see them.  We take for granted the 
multi-billion-dollar inventory of utility poles, wires, and facilities lining our 
streets.  Yet, our modern economy, Internet, telephone service, cable and many 
video services, electricity, and the activities these services empower, all depend 
on access to the utility pole. 
The CPUC has the authority to do “all things . . . necessary” to carry out its 
authority,399 and to ensure that utilities provide safe, reliable service, with 
adequate facilities, consistent with just and reasonable rates and the state’s 
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environmental goals.  The CPUC’s duty to protect public safety is paramount.  
Competition, safety, reliability, and service are intertwined values that govern 
utility pole access and administration.  The CPUC must promptly act to protect 
competition, public safety, affordability and access, and mitigate climate change 
by adopting utility pole governance that safeguards these values. 
 
